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THE CRIME CRISIS AND PROPOSED
PROCEDURAL REFORM
by Robert A. Kessler*
It is seemingly becoming more and more difficult to gain acceptance for
the proposition that punishment of the guilty is desirable, other things
being equal. One commentator, who attempted in vain to dissuade
this Court from today's holding, thought it necessary to point out that
there is "a strong public interest in convicting the guilty." Indeed the
day may soon come when the ever-cautious law reviews will actu-
ally be forced to offer the timid and uncertain contention, recently sug-
gested satirically, that "crime may be thought socially undesirable, and
its control a 'valid governmental objective' to which the criminal law is
'rationally related.' "1
Today's crime crisis has truly assumed pandemic proportions. While
the quantum of criminal occurrences increases at an alarming rate,2
barely one in nine of the serious crimes reported annually to the police
results in a conviction.3  Although we are told that certainty of swift
punishment is the principal deterrent to crime,4 we foster a system of
* Professor of Law, Fordham University. A.B. 1949, Yale University; J.D. 1952,
Columbia University; LL.M. 1959, New York University.
1. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 240-41 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting)
(footnotes omitted) (holding that a claim of unconstitutional search and seizure by a
federal prisoner is cognizable in a post-conviction proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255).
2. See FBI, UNiFORm CrIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 2 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as UNiroxm Ciuim REPORTS] wherein the Federal Bureau of Investigation reports
a 176% increase in crime from 1960 to 1970.
3. R. CLARK, CIumm Nlr AMrcC 117-18 (1970); see UNiwo~m CRUE REPORTS,
supra note 2, at 33-36; What the Police Can-and Cannot-Do About Crime, TIME,
July 13, 1970, at 34: "Of all reported major offenses only 12% lead to arrests, only
6% to convictions and 1% to prison."
It must be conceded, however, that the statistics in this regard may often be mislead-
ing. For instance, when a criminal engages in 50 to 100 crimes per year the cumulative
statistical chance that he will escape conviction is significantly lower than should he
commit 1 to 10 crimes per year. On the other hand, many crimes are unreported or the
culprits never arrested. This necessarily emphasizes the major "enforcement" problem
which faces our society. See note 6 infra.
4. H. PACKER, THE LumiTs OF THE CRIMINAL. S~ANCION 287-88 (1968); B. WOOTTON,
CRME AND Tr= CRnImAL LAw 98-99 (1963); Andenaes, The General Preventive Ef-
fects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 949, 964-65 (1966); Bator, Finality in Criminal
Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 452 n.21
(1963); Burger, The State of the Judiciary-1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 929, 931-32 (1970);
Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activities and the Effectiveness of Law Enforce-
ment, in NAT'L BunAu oF ECONOMIC REsEARcH, 50T ANIuAL REPORT 77 (1970)
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criminal justice which encourages delay, uncertainty and ultimately more
crime. 5 Moreover, while the fundamental difficulty faced by the ad-
ministration of our system of justice may be best characterized as a
"police problem,"6 a dramatic improvement in the detection and ap-
prehension of criminals will be meaningless should the juridical process
allow factually guilty arrestees to escape conviction and punishment.7
This article is not intended as a panacea for the criminal woes afflict-
ing our society.8 Nor is its purpose to denounce recent landmark
(results of a statistical survey confirm that the probability and severity of punishment
have a significant deterrent effect on all offenses); Williams, Crime, Punishment, Vio-
lence and Dissent; A Crisis of Authority, 45 CAL. STATE BJ. 817, 824 (1970). See
R. CLARY, CRIME IN AMERICA 119 (1970); see generally CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY CoM-
mr=XEE ON CRIMINAL PRocEDuRE, PROGRESS REPORT-DETERRENT EFFEcTs OF CRIM-
NAL SANCTIONS 25 (1968); but see Bazelon, New Gods for Old: "Efficient" Courts in
a Democratic Society, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 653 (1971).
5. Edward Bennett Williams vividly characterized the plight of the criminal justice
system in a speech before the California State Bar Association:
They [criminals] go out in the street to do their mischief on one basic prem-
ise--that they won't get caught! And the record shows they're right 80 percent
of the time! And they go out on another basic premise. Their downside position
is that if by some wild fortuity they're apprehended by the police that they can
tinker with the archaic, outmoded, antiquated American criminal justice system for
two years before they face the day of reckoning. You think that's a deterrent?
You bet it's not! Williams, Crime, Punishment, Violence and Dissent; A Crisis
of Authority, 45 CAL. STATE BJ. 817, 822 (1970).
6. This term connotes the dramatic improvement needed in the facilities, man-
power, and detection methods and devices available to the federal and state law en-
forcement agencies. See FORD FOUNDATiON, A MORE EFFECr E ARM 1 (1970):
The need for reinforcement and change in police work has become more urgent
than ever in the last decade because of rising rates of crime, increased resort to
violence; and rising tension, in many communities, between disaffected or angry
groups and the police.
Prominent police officials and criminal justice experts with whom we have con-
sulted in the last two years verify our own staff analysis that initiatives for
change in the police function are critically needed to improve both police effec-
tiveness and the quality of American justice.
See also THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND Ti ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 91 (1967):
The entire system-courts and corrections as well as the police-is charged with
enforcing the law and maintaining order. What is distinctive about the re-
sponsibility of the police is that they are charged with performing these functions
where all eyes are upon them and where the going is roughest, on the street.
Since this is a time of increasing crime, increasing social unrest and increasing
public sensitivity to both, it is a time when police work is peculiarly important,
complicated, conspicuous, and delicate.
7. For a discussion of factual guilt as compared with legal guilt see text accom-
panying notes 18-19 infra.
8. Assuredly, there is no panacea for the criminal problems which inflict our society.
Indeed, crime seems to be an inevitable concomitant of our American culture. How
else is it, for instance, that Tokyo (population of 11.5 million) sustained only 20% the
number of murders which occurred in New York City (population of 7 million) in
1970? Or that Tokyo sustained only 474 robberies as compared with 74,102 in New
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decisions of the United States Supreme Court." Rather, this article
will propose five changes in the rules of criminal procedure which,
if effectively utilized, would allow our system of justice to operate
more expeditiously in today's crime infested society.10  It is sub-
mitted that the rules criticized herein have so shifted the balance
between society's need for protection against crime, and the interests of
those persons suspected and accused of crime, that the latter now un-
duly prevail upon the scales of justice. A fresh examination of these
rules will reveal that they no longer aid in the achievement of the para-
mount goals of criminal law and criminal procedure. Further, strict
adherence to some of these rules has served only to debilitate the de-
terrent effect of the law and to unleash upon society persons who,
though adjudged legally innocent, were perhaps factually guilty.:"
It has been stated that the primary purpose of the criminal law is the
York? Los Angeles Times, Dec. 3, 1971, pt. 1-A, at 2, col. 1. It has been stated that
in order to eliminate the occurrence of crime per se in our society, the very fountain-
heads of crime would have to be abrogated: poverty, drugs, racism, unemployment,
sickness, alcoholism, avarice and hatred. R. CLARK, CRIVM IN AmERicA 17 (1970).
However, the simple enumeration of these causes evinces the almost quixotic task in-
volved in their eradication. The Japanese society is assuredly afflicted with these
causal factors; nevertheless, crime there appears to be a minor occurrence. Per-
haps this disparity supports the subjectivists' view that crime is caused by elements
within the criminal himself (see note 16 infra) and that the Occidental is inherently
more criminally prone than his Oriental cousin. As such, the Hobbesian theory con-
cerning the inherent vices of human nature would necessarily be limited to the Western
culture. Nevertheless, it is the author's opinion that crime, being a firmly established
"vice" within the Western culture and man, will continue to increase proportionately, if
not geometrically, with the population increase. This view seems adequately bolstered
by the current statistics concerning crime. See note 2 supra.
9. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (statements of a defendant
in custodial interrogation inadmissible if the defendant not warned of his right to re-
main silent, that statements may be used against him, of his right to counsel, and, if
indigent, of his right to appointed counsel); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination held applicable to the states); Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel during jailhouse
interrogation held applicable to the states); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(indigent defendant charged with felony has right to be represented by court-appointed
counsel).
10. The proposals are: (1) eliminate the exclusionary rule (see text accompanying
notes 32-59 infra); (2) allow prior-convictions as direct evidence during the case-in-
chief (see text accompanying notes 60-90 infra); (3) abolish trial by jury as a matter
of right (see text accompanying notes 91-144 infra); (4) change the standard of
proof to preponderance of the evidence (see text accompanying notes 145-177 infra);
and (5) modify the appellate process and limit the scope of federal habeas corpus (see
text accompanying notes 178-244 infra).
11. While many persons arrested and charged may well be innocent, there are numer-
ous inadequacies in the present system of justice which too easily allow a guilty ar-
restee to go free. For a discussion of various circumstances, other than innocence,
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prevention of crime,' 2 while the primary purpose of criminal procedure is
the assurance of a just disposition of the dispute before the court.'8 How-
ever, since a criminal proceeding may be adjudicatively disposed of in
only two manners--by acquittal or by conviction' 4-- it follows more par-
ticularly that the purpose of criminal procedure is the assurance of a just
conviction or a just acquittal. Since what is "just" in this respect may
only be determined by the prevailing societal standard concerning the
essence of Justice itself,' 5 our society, afflicted as it is with an alarming
incidence of crime, would assuredly accept the conviction of the
guilty' 6 and the acquittal of the innocent as representing truly just dis-
which warrant dismissals or acquittals see R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERIC 118-19
(1970). It has recently been intimated that of the many persons arrested for
crimes, the greater percentage have actually been instrumental in their commis-
sion. See Cole, Criminal Justice as an Exchange System, 3 RuTo. CAmDEN L.I. 18,
31 (1971). Further, the FBI statistics on recidivism and rearrest tend to create some
doubt concerning the innocent nature of many of those freed by acquittal or dismissal:
Of those persons who were acquitted or had their cases dismissed in 1965, 85
percent were rearrested for new offenses. Of those released on probation 56
percent repeated, [on] parole 61 percent [repeated], and [on] mandatory release
after serving prison time 75 percent [repeated]. UNm'onm CRUME REPORTS, supra
note 2, at 39.
12. See H. PACKER, THE LIrrs OF THE CMmiNAL SANCTION 16 (1968).
13. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960). Instructive of the purposes for which the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were designed is Rule 2:
* . to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding . . . [tlo
secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of
unjustifiable expense and delay. FED. R. ClaM. P. 2.
14. Although a plea of nolo contendere or a mistrial may dispose of a criminal
proceeding, a just disposition requires a finding of either guilt or innocence. This is
what juries are charged to determine. E.g., E. DEviTT & C. BLACKMA*, FEDERAL JURY
PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS §§ 17.01-.21 (2d ed. 1970).
15. See Breitel, Criminal Law and Equal Justice, 1966 UTAH L. Rv. 1. For an
excellent analysis of the various, and often contradictory, definitions of Justice which
have been pronounced through the centuries by noted philosophers see H. KELsON,
WHAT Is JUSnCE? (1960).
16. In order to effectively deter those with a propensity for crime, their conviction
must be certain and punishment must follow swiftly therefrom. Note 4 supra.
Rehabilitation within the prison system itself, while not literally a deterrent to
crime, may be an effective curative device which could significantly reduce the crime
rate. Such rehabilitation is needed in order to halt the alarming amount of recidivism
and to close once and for all the revolving door process of crime, arrest, imprisonment,
rearrest and reimprisonment. However, the despicable conditions existent in our
present penal system seem to be fostering crime rather than preventing it:
Beatings, deaths and suicides are frequent [in the prison system]. Rape and
homosexual cultures involve most of the inmates by choice or force. . . . They
[prisons] are breeding places of crime, violence and despair. R. CLARKE, CRIME IN
AMERuCA 213-14 (1970).
The current rash of prison riots is an obvious result of the intolerable conditions
under which many prisoners are forced to survive. Though a great percentage of re-
cidivism might be eliminated through more stringent parole standards, it is axiomatic
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positions. Additionally, should the conviction of the guilty be certain
and the correlative punishment be swift, the criminal procedure would
further the purpose of the criminal law.'"
The continuing task of criminal procedure has been to make the de-
termination of guilt or innocence as accurate as possible. Since it was
early recognized that a system of human design and application could
never be perfect, it was deemed preferable to have the system err on the
side of leniency and thereby allow some of the guilty to escape rather than
punish any innocent person.18  What necessarily evolved was a bi-
furcation of the concepts of guilt and innocence into what may be
termed legal guilt and legal innocence, and factual guilt and factual in-
nocence.
The concept of legal guilt in the United States today constitutes
more than a mere determination that the accused has engaged in
that mere isolation from society, in addition to its being totally inhumane and im-
practical, could never "cure!' an individual's propensity to crime. It should therefore
be incumbent upon society, once it has captured a suspect and determined his guilt,
to attempt to rehabilitate the criminal in order that he may re-enter society as a more
useful member thereof. While most penologists agree that rehabilitation may be an im-
portant means to reduce the high recidivism rates (see AMEICAN CoRREcTioNAL Ass'N,
MANuAL oF CoRREciONAL STANDARDS (1966)), few prisoners receive any cura-
tive treatment. 117 CONG. REC. S416 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1971) (remarks of Senator
Mondale). Senator Mondale noted that of approximately 3000 jails, 85 percent had
no educational or recreational facilities, 50 percent had no medical facilities, and 25
percent had no visiting facilities. Id.
Of course, rehabilitation is a tenable concept only if crime is subjectively viewed,
i.e., if it is caused through abnormalities or aberrations existing primarily within the
criminal himself. If the objectivist approach should be taken-that offenders are
really normal beings who have been exposed to external criminogenic forces-then
only the elimination of the external sources of crime such as poverty, drugs, et al.
(note 8 supra) could appreciably affect the rate of crime. D. TAFT & R. ENGLAND,
CRIMINOLOGY 66-67 (4th ed. 1964).
There is an additional theory concerning the causes of criminal behavior which can
neither be termed subjective nor objective. This is the "extra gene" theory which es-
pouses a link between criminality and an XYY chromosome complement. See Note,
The XYY Chromosome Defense, 57 GiEo. L.J 892 (1969). While no court has yet
accepted the defense of chromosomal abnormality as establishing a lack of legal re-
sponsibility there is persuasive support for such a theory. See Comment, The XYY
Chromosome Abnormality and Criminal Behavior, 3 Co'N. L. REv. 484 (1971); Note,
The XYY Chromosome Defense, 57 GEo. L.J. 892 (1969); Note, 6 TuLsA L. REv. 293
(1970). If such a theory should be established, imprisonment would be useless and
hospitalization would seem to be the only tenable cure. Comment, The XYY Chromo-
some Abnormality and Criminal Behavior, 3 CoNN. L. REv. 484, 509-10 (1971).
17. This purpose is the prevention of crime (note 12 supra and accompanying text),
the most effective deterrent of which is swift and certain punishment. Note 4 supra
and accompanying text.
18. See note 26 infra and accompanying text.
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conduct prohibited by the criminal law. Rather, a person is to be
held legally guilty of a crime only if the factual determination that
he did what he is accused of is based upon reliable evidence and
is made in a procedurally regular fashion by a duly authorized and
competent authority.19 In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, how-
ever, the adjudication of guilt or innocence in England was determined
in a contrary and quite bizarre manner. The accused was subjected
to various tortures20 until or unless the state received the information
or confession it desired. 1 Such methods were condoned on the ground
that the state and society were in constant danger.22 "Thus the state trials
of the period were regarded, not as impartial enquiries into the guilt
or innocence of a prisoner, but as incidents in the never ceasing warfare
between the state and its enemies." 21 As such, though the accused may
not have actually committed the act proscribed, he was nevertheless
19. H. PACKER, THE LimTS OF THE CRUMNAL SANCTION 166 (1968):
None of these requirements [e.g., jurisdiction, double jeopardy, venue, statute of
limitations] has anything to do with the factual question of whether the person
did or did not engage in the conduct that is charged as the offense against him;
yet favorable answers to any of them will mean that he is legally innocent.
The variance between the concepts of legal guilt and factual guilt is dependent upon
the prevailing philosophy concerning the relation of the defendant to the state. A
defendant-oriented society will place great emphasis upon the various screening fac-
tors through which one must pass before he is adjudged legally guilty or legally
innocent. In such a society, a great variance necessarily exists between legal guilt
and factual guilt, while little variance would exist between legal innocence and factual
guilt. However, in a society which places a stronger emphasis upon crime prevention
and control, there will exist little variance between legal guilt and factual guilt, with a
much greater variance between legal innocence and factual guilt.
20. Torture was used not alone in the Star Chamber, but "as a matter of course in
all grave accusations, at the mere discretion of the King and the Privy Council, and
uncontrolled by any law besides the prerogative of the Sovereign." Ploscowe, The
Development of Present-Day Criminal Procedures in Europe and America, 48
HARv. L. REv. 433, 458 (1935), quoting JARDINE, A READING ON Tn USE OF
TORTuRE IN TnE CRMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 17 (1837).
The Rack appeared to be the favorite and most effective method of extracting desired
information.
The Racke is us'd no where as in England. In other Countries tis us'd in
Judicature, when there is a semi-plena probatio, a half proofe against a man, then
to see if they cann make it full, they racke him to try if bee will Confess. But
here in England, they take a man & racke him, I doe not know why, nor when,
not in time of Judicature, but when some body bidds. TABLE TALK OF JOHN
SELDEN 133 (Pollock ed. 1927).
While the use of torture may have seemed antithetical to the common law, its use was
acknowledged and at times approved by some of the noted scholars of that era. See
5 W. HoLnswORTr, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 185-87 (3rd ed. 1945).
21. See 5 W. HoLDSWORTH, A ISToRY OF ENGLISH LAW 184, 186-90 (3rd ed. 1945);
Ploscowe, The Development of Present-Day Criminal Procedures in Europe and Amer-
ica, 48 HAav. L. REv. 433, 458 (1935).
22. 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, A ISToRy OF ENGLISH LAW 189-90 (3rd ed. 1945).
23. Id. at 190.
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adjudged legally guilty in order to placate the fears and anxieties of the
state.
With the inevitable abandonment of judicial torture, the English
criminal procedure witnessed a gradual development in favor of the
accused.24 Certain procedural safeguards were afforded in order to
redress the overbearing bias toward the state,2" and theorists espoused
the validity of allowing ten guilty men to go free in order to save one
innocent person. 26 In the late nineteenth century, additional protections
were forged for the defendant.2 r The concept of legal guilt assumed a
posture quite dissimilar to its all-encompassing forerunner of centuries
past, and the scales of justice swung discernibly to the side of the ac-
cused and away from the interests of society.
In the United States the procedural rights of the criminally accused
developed apace along with their counterparts in England. By 1923
the effects of this development led Judge Learned Hand to caustically
observe:
While the prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he [the defendant]
need not disclose the barest outline of his defense. He is immune from
question or comment on his silence; he cannot be convicted when there
24. See generally Ploscowe, The Development of Present-Day Criminal Procedures
in Europe and America, 48 HARv. L. REv. 433, 453-60, 467-72 (1935).
25. The right to trial by jury developed into its modem form in the early fifteenth
century. See T. PLucKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF TE COMMON LAW 129 (5th
ed. 1956). The right to cross-examine witnesses developed in the seventeenth cen-
tury (PLucKNETr, supra at 130), while the right to call witnesses on one's behalf be-
came established in the eighteenth century. PLUCKNETT, supra 436.
26. In the seventeenth century, Justice Matthew Hale believed that five guilty men
should be acquitted before one innocent man was convicted. See 2 M. HALE, PLEAS
OF THE CRowN 288 (W. Stokes & E. Ingersoll ed. 1847). Blackstone believed the
ratio to be 10 to 1 (4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMBNTAUIES *358) while Starkie believed
that the ratio should be 99 to 1. See 1 T. STARKm, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE
LAw OF EVDENCE 506 (4th Am. ed. 1832). For a discussion of this rather puzzling
geometric increase in the ratio see text accompanying notes 165-175 infra. While the
tenet that some of the guilty should escape before any of the innocent are punished is
fundamental to our common law heritage, attempts to affix a quantitative definition on
this tenet can only reflect the prevailing mood of the times. In this time of crime crisis,
the ratio should be substantially reduced in order to assure that fewer guilty are allowed
to sift through the nets of justice.
27. The rights to counsel and to testify on one's behalf were not established until
the latter part of the nineteenth century. PLucKNEr, supra note 25, at 434-35, 437.
In light of the consummate formulation of these rights, it is questionable whether
certain of the protections afforded earlier (e.g., jury trial and reasonable doubt
standard) are requisite to the proper balance between the rights of the accused and
of society. More particularly, it is contended herein that the elimination of these
earlier "substitute" protections will further the proper conviction of the many factually
guilty persons who are presently allowed to sift through the system of justice.
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is the least fair doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve .... Our
dangers do not lie in too little tenderness to the accused. Our proce-
dure has been always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man con-
victed. It is an unreal dream. What we need to fear is the archaic
formalism and the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, and defeats
the prosecution of crime.
28
In the forty-nine years since Judge Hand's prophetic statement even
more significant protections have been afforded the accused.2" The
hiatus between the concepts of legal guilt and factual guilt has con-
28. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (denying a motion
to inspect grand jury minutes in order to establish a case to quash an indictment).
29. For example, at the pre-arrest stage, before an arrest or search warrant may be
issued, the existence of substantial and corroborating underlying circumstances justifying
the issuance of a warrant must be shown to a neutral and detached magistrate.
Further, any informants must be shown to be reliable or credible. Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Giordenello v.
United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958). At the arrest stage, the accused must be in-
formed of his right to remain silent, that statements may be used against him, of
his right to counsel, and, if indigent, of his right to appointed counsel. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). These warnings must be given at any stage where the
accused may be considered to be under custodial interrogation, i.e., significantly de-
prived of his freedom of action. See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969). At the
trial stage, the accused may avail himself of liberal discovery rules unheard of in
Learned Hand's time. See FED. R. Clum. P. 16. While the government also has the
advantage of certain discovery, proposed amendments to Rule 16 would allow the de-
fendant even more leeway in discovery while subjecting the government's discovery to
constitutional limitations. COMMITTEE ON RuLEs OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF TIM
JUDIcIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CImINAL PROCEDURE, 48 F.R.D. 553, 587-610
(1969); ABA, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITrEE ON FEDERAL RULES OF PROcEDuRE,
52 F.R.D. 87, 96-101 (1971).
There is, however, one vestige of our outdated criminal procedure which definitely
has not proved advantageous to the accused. This is the use of the grand jury as the
exclusive method of initiating a criminal proceeding for serious crimes. The grand jury,
instead of properly reflecting community-wide notions of fairness, is merely a pawn in
the hands of the prosecutor, and is dependent upon him for direction, for guidance, and
for rules of law. See Antell, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted Supergovernment, 51
A.B.A.J. 153 (1965); Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 ORE. L. REv. 295
(1931). As such, the use of the grand jury amounts to a nigh form of underhandedness,
and certainly cannot be condoned in any efficient and effective administration of justice.
While the federal constitutional mandate that criminal proceedings be initiated by a
grand jury indictment is not applicable to the states (Gaines v. Washington, 277 U.S.
81 (1928); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); Morford v. Hocker, 394 F.2d
169 (9th Cir. 1968) ), certain states have retained the indictment as the exclusive
method of commencing serious criminal prosecutions. See Comment, The Grand Jury,
Past and Present: A Survey, 2 AM. Cium. L. Q. 119 (1964). It is submitted that these
states would be well-advised to adopt the "information" as an alternative means of
commencing criminal actions, and that the grand jury be retained, if at all, only for
investigatory purposes and for those notorious scandals deemed "just too hot to handle."
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tinually widened while that between factual guilt and legal innocence
has portentiously contracted. While a distinction between these deter-
minative concepts was once justified in order to overcome the oppres-
sions of a paranoid state, the gulf which exists today serves only to de-
bilitate the purpose of the criminal law. And despite the prevailing
sophistry which equates guilt with proof of that guilt, and innocence
with the mere failure of that proof, the fact of guilt or innocence must
be the relevant consideration in every criminal case.
Today we are faced with a crime crisis. While no one would advo-
cate a return to the capricious practices of centuries past, it must be rec-
ognized that the prevailing temperament of our society appears to be one
of fear-not fear of the state but instead fear for the well-being of our-
selves and our society.30 The generous rights of the accused have taken
an undue precedence over the rights of the innocent victims of crime
within our society.31 Restoration of a proper balance between these con-
flicting and counterpoised rights necessarily opens for debate the validity
of many of our heretofore fundamental rights, rules and procedures. The
following proposals will hopefully engender such debate.
I. PERMIT THE USE OF PHYSICAL EVIDENCE SEIZED DURING
ANY SEARCH AND SEIzUE
The United States Supreme Court ushered in this century by unani-
mously holding there is no doctrine guaranteeing private security in per-
son and property nor the sanctity of the home to the extent of excluding
evidence obtained by unlawful means, if it is otherwise competent.3
2
Since then many changes have been wrought both in our society and
30. According to the FBI, more than one in every forty people in this country will
be the victim of crime this year. Many will be the victims of serious crimes. See
UNiFoRm CRIME REPORTS, supra note 2, at 5.
31. Justice Breitel is a firm upholder of victims' rights and has cogently noted:
While no cost or necessity will justify the thumbscrew or the rack, however
effective or reliable (and they may be reliable when artfully used, if only the
suspect is not told what to say), it is also true that the present or future victim,
especially of violence, should not be sacrificed to preserve the rights of wrong-
doers. Victims, too, have an individuality to protect. Victims, too, are entitled
to freedom from invasion. If it were conceivable to strike a quantitative equiva-
lence between the victim of violence and grave deprediation and the wrongdoer,
and if there were no choice except to have the injury applied to the one or have the
state apply its force to the other, there is no question what choice would be
made by reasonable men. If it were demonstrably true that a choice is unavoid-
able between exposing a victim to the crime of rape or obtaining a confession
from a rapist with regard to a prior offense without the benefit of counsel-if that
were literally the only choice-there is no doubt what choice should be made.
Breitel, Criminal Law and Equal Justice, 1966 UTAH L. REv. 1, 18-19.
32. Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904). Mr. Justice Day stated: "When
papers are offered in evidence the court can take no notice how they were obtained,
whether lawfully or unlawfully. . . ." Id. at 595.
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in our legal system. The rule laid down by Justice Day has been
twisted, bent, and broken to form an exclusionary rule which every day
seems to stretch itself in more imaginative contortions."3 It is unfortu-
nate, but for most courts and members of the Bar, the exclusionary rule
has become a concept evoking thought only of its scope and never its
purpose.34 Nothing less than a rethinking of the purposes and effects
of the exclusionary rule, as it is applied to physical evidence, is called
33. The development of the exclusionary rule may be traced by noting four cases.
In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), there was dictum hinting that evidence
resulting from a Fourth Amendment violation should be excluded at time of trial.
This dictum was adopted as federal law in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
The exclusionary rule at first remained optional with the states under Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949), but finally became mandatory under Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
Numerous articles have been written expressing disillusionment with the exclusionary
rule. A representative sampling is found in the appendix to Chief Justice Burger's
dissenting opinion in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which contains the following list at 426-27:
1. Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches-A Comment
on People vs. Cahan, 43 Calif. L. Rev. 565 (1955).
2. Bums, Mapp v. Ohio: An All-American Mistake, 19 DePaul L. Rev. 80
(1969).
3. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 Calif. L.
Rev. 929, 951-54 (1965).
4. F. Inbau, J. Thompson, & C. Sowle, Cases and Comments on Criminal Jus-
tice: Criminal Law Administration 1-84 (3d ed. 1968).
5. LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule (pts.
1 & 2), 30 Mo. L. Rev. 391, 566 (1965).
6. LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making
and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 987 (1965).
7. N. Morris & G. Hawkins, The Honest Politician's Guide to Crime Con-
trol 101 (1970).
8. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 665 (1970).
9. Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 Cornell L.Q. 337 (1939).
10. Schaefer, The Fourteenth Amendment and Sanctity of the Person, 64
Nw. U.L. Rev. 1 (1969).
11. Waite, Judges and the Crime Burden, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 169 (1955).
12. Waite, Evidence-Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence, 42 Mich. L.
Rev. 679 (1944).
13. Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 8
A.B.A.J. 479 (1922).
14. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2184a (McNaughton rev. 1961).
Accord, Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRM.
L.C. & P.S. 255 (1961); Taft, Protecting the Public from Mapp v. Ohio Without
Amending the Constitution, 50 A.B.A.J. 815 (1964); Comment, Effect of Mapp v.
Ohio on Police Search-and-Seizure Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4 CoLum. J.L. & Soc.
PRoB. 87 (1968); Comment, Search and Seizure in Illinois: Enforcement of the Con-
stitutional Right of Privacy, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 493 (1952). See also Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 490 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
34. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once observed: "It is one of the misfortunes of
the law that ideas become encysted in phrases and thereafter for a long time cease to
provoke further analysis." Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 391 (1912) (dissenting
opinion),
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for if our legal system is to rid itself of the distortions of justice which
now pollute our decisional law. Action is mandated to restore our
legal system to a more reasoned condition by restricting the scope of
the exclusionary rule to illegally obtained statements.
The reasons advanced in favor of the exclusionary rule have never
varied since first fixed in Weeks v. United States. 5  They are two-
fold: (1) the exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of an illegal
search and seizure is the only effective means of deterring police in-
fringement of an individual's fourth amendment right of privacy, and
(2) illegally obtained evidence must be excluded if the dignity of the
Court is to be upheld since admission of such evidence would condone
the flouting of the law by public officials.36 Neither of these reasons
has been put to an empirical test but there is evidence which strongly
suggests that the reasons on which the exclusionary rule is bottomed are
invalid.
Professor Dallin Oaks has authored a brilliant article in which he sug-
gests that the underpinning of the exclusionary rule is indeed shaky.
37
Observing the weakness of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent to illegal
police conduct, Professor Oaks notes that "its penal effect is felt only
when a case comes to court and there is an attempt to introduce illegally
obtained evidence to secure a conviction."38s If police misconduct is
to be deterred, the exclusionary rule should exert a direct effect on the
offending officer. But it fails to do this. Professor Oaks illustrates
some of the unfavorable conditions for deterrence. A policeman guilty
of conducting an illegal search is not affected in his person or his
35. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
36. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
An argument that has seemingly never been met is why must a search, albeit an illegal
one, that uncovers admissible physical evidence be considered "unreasonable". It would
seem that a search which leads to a successful conclusion in the discovery of tangible
evidence is quite reasonable. Further, the Fourth Amendment makes no provision for
the exclusion of evidence.
37. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. REv.
665 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Oaks].
38. Id. at 720. This article points out that the exclusionary rule as a deterrent de-
vice against official misconduct is of little value when the "misconduct is not directed
toward acquiring evidence or if it is not likely to result in a prosecution." It is
particularly relevant to know that a large proportion of persons arrested are never
actually charged with an offense. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFoRcEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JusTICn, TASK FoRcn REPORT: THE PoLIcE 186-87 (1967).
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pocketbook by the application of the rule. The impact of having evi-
dence excluded falls on the prosecutor, and hence the public, and not
on the officer who may feel his act is morally justified and within the
norms of behavior for his particular police unit. The nuances of the
exclusionary rule are often unclear or have not been communicated to
the police or, as is often the case, the motivation for conducting an ille-
gal search and recovering contraband outweighs in an officer's mind
the later difficulties presented at a suppression hearing. 8
A more telling attack on the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule
is found in the large number of suppression hearings held after its in-
ception.40  These statistics demonstrate the ineffectiveness per se of the
deterrent aspects of the rule. Moreover, the threatened exclusion of
evidence illegally obtained sometimes causes the police to deliberately
give false testimony in order to justify their search.41
The second justification-the necessity of judicial integrity-given
for the exclusionary rule has never received much support other than
rhetoric found in Supreme Court decisions.42 The Supreme Court has
grounded most of its opinions on the deterrence rationale.48 In addi-
tion, common law jurisdictions such as England and Canada, .univer-
sally recognized as models of judicial practice, have never employed
an exclusionary rule.44 What is difficult to explain is why, if eviden-
tial suppression is indeed underpinned by the desire to protect judicial
39. Oaks, supra note 37, at 724-3 1.
40. See Comment, Search and Seizure in Illinois: Enforcement of the Constitu-
tional Right of Privacy, 47 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 493 (1952). After extensively considering
suppression motions in Chicago Municipal Court, the Comment concluded at 497-98:
[The rule has failed to deter any substantial number of illegal searches....
These figures . . may indicate that the exclusionary rule is most effective in
discouraging illegal searches in cases involving serious offenses, where conviction
is important. Conversely, where the police believe that a policy of harassment is
an effective means of law enforcement, the exclusionary rule will not deter their
use of unlawful methods.
See generally Oaks, supra note 37, at 706-09; Graham, The Court May Propose But
the Police Dispose, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1968, § 4, at 9, col. 1, wherein the author
concludes, based upon the fact that for the year 1966 only 17 requests for search
warrants were made by the San Francisco police, that "there has been no perceptible
change in the habits of the nation's police [since Mapp v. Ohio]."
41. J. SKoLmcK, JuscE WrroUT TRIAL 215 (1967); see also Comment, Effect of
Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search-and-Seizure Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4 CoLuM.
J.L. & SOCIAL PROB. 87 (1968).
42. Oaks, supra note 37, at 669.
43. Id. at 669-70.
44. See generally Martin, The Exclusionary Rule under Foreign Law-Canada, 52
J. CM. L.C. & P.S. 271 (1961); Williams, The Exclusionary Rule under Foreign
Law-England, 52 J. CRim. L.C. & P.S. 272 (1961); Taft, Protecting the Public from
Mapp v. Ohio Without Amending the Constitution, 50 A.B.A.J. 815 (1964).
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integrity, the exclusionary rule is applied when a judicial officer improv-
idently issues a search or arrest warrant.4 5 Clearly, judicial integrity
is not the basis of the exclusionary rule.46 In fact, the tendency of the
present Court is to promote judicial integrity by refusing to invalidate
warrants in situations where suppression would previously have been
indicated.
47
Consideration must be given to the negative effects of the exclu-
sionary rule. The words of Justice Jackson in Irvine v. California are
instructive:
That the rule of exclusion and reversal results in the escape of guilty
persons is more capable of demonstration than that it deters invasion
of right by the police. . . . Rejection of the evidence does nothing to
punish the wrong-doing official, while it may, and likely will, release
the wrong-doing defendant. It deprives society of its remedy against
one lawbreaker because he has been pursued by another. It protects
one against whom incriminating evidence is discovered, but does noth-
ing to protect innocent persons who are the victims of illegal but fruit-
less searches. 48
The exclusionary rule also causes delay in the administration of justice
while suppression hearings are held, makes possible the immunity of a
criminal through the collusive act of a police officer and encourages po-
lice imposition of extra-judicial punishment on persons who escape con-
viction.40  But the greatest negative effect of the exclusionary rule is
that so long as it is accorded constitutional dimension it cannot be re-
placed. While it exists, efforts to establish a corrective granting redress
to the innocent whose privacy was improperly invaded by the police
45. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108 (1964); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
46. Indeed, even illegally obtained evidence which had been suppressed at trial may
be used by a trial judge at time of fixing sentencing where the evidence is reliable and
has not been gathered for the express purpose of improperly influencing the sentencing
judge. United States v. Schipani, 315 F. Supp. 253 (E.D.N.Y.), affd, 435 F.2d
26 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971).
47. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971); See State v. Bisaccia, 58 N.J. 586,
279 A.2d 675 (1971). In Bisaccia the New Jersey Supreme Court, in considering
whether a search warrant based upon an affidavit which incorrectly gave the street
number of the premises but fully described the property was invalid, stated:
In the case now before us, there is no definitive opinion of the United
States Supreme Court holding the search to be invalid. Our task is to anticipate
whether a majority of that Court would extend Mapp to the circumstances before
us. We would hope that it would not. Here the policeman and the magistrate in
good faith sought to abide by the Constitution. Id. at 589, 279 A.2d 678.
The opinion was filed without dissent.
48. 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954).
49. See Oaks, supra note 37, at 736-52.
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may be forestalled."0
Before the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Mapp
v. Ohio5 it was unclear whether the federal exclusionary rule of Weeks
v. United States5 2 was based upon the provisions of the Fourth Amend-
ment or upon the Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court." The ap-
plication of the exclusionary rule in Mapp, a state court case, resolved
all doubt. Since the Supervisory Power is applicable only to Article
II courts,54 Mapp raised the exclusionary rule to constitutional stature.
To unchain our courts, at least those of the states, from the burdens en-
cumbering them under the exclusionary rule will require the overruling
of Mapp v. Ohio.5 5 Such action has been proposed or intimated by
case and periodical alike.56
Mapp should not be overruled, however, until a substitute protec-
tion of personal privacy is forged. There are, of course, already exist-
ing remedies to prevent unnecessary police intrusions upon a man's
home or person. For example, law enforcement agents assume a risk
of tort liability or injunctive prohibition against harassment if their
guess is wrong. But redress against the police through tort liability, as
50. Id. at 753.
51. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Mapp, however, is not retroactive. Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U.S. 618 (1965).
52. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
53. U.S. CONsT. art. I, §§ 1-2 is the source of the Supreme Court's Supervisory
Power.
54. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 320 (1966) (Warren, C.J., dis-
senting); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S.
657 (1957); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
55. The Supreme Court clearly has the power to overrule. See Helvering v.
Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 401 (1943).
56. See note 33 supra. A caustic appraisal of Mapp was recently afforded by Chief
Justice Weintraub speaking for the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Bisaccia,
58 N.J. 586, 588, 279 A.2d 675, 677 (1971):
When the truth is suppressed and the criminal is set free, the pain of suppression
is felt, not by the inanimate State or by some penitent policeman, but by the of-
fender's next victims for whose protection we hold office. In that direct way,
Mapp denies the innocent the protection due them.
But Mapp impairs the primary right of the individual to protection from
crime in still other ways. The release of the guilty must blunt and breed contempt
for the deterrent thrust of the criminal law. Moreover the case-by-case process of
law-making in the application of Mapp has left State officers quite at sea as to what
is expected of them. The time-distance between the Supreme Court and the firing
line is just too great and the case-by-case process too lumbering and too cumber-
some, to permit that Court to exercise effective and responsible management of
the criminal business of the States. As a result, the State courts (and the federal
bench as well) are drained of energy sorely needed for the trial of criminal and
civil cases, as motions to suppress are piled upon motions, appeals upon appeals,
and post-conviction proceedings upon post-conviction proceedings.
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presently constituted, or injunctive prohibition is often ineffective. 7
Perhaps the Supreme Court has already taken the initiative in provid-
ing an effective remedy in Bivens v. Six Unkown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics5 8 by interpreting the Fourth Amendment
as positive law, the violation of which by federal officers authorizes the
maintenance of a civil action. The establishment in Bivens of a federal
cause of action for illegal searches and seizures may foreshadow the
demise of Mapp. What is needed to hasten its demise, however, are
legislators who are willing to engineer the drafting of legislation offering
redress to the aggrieved individual whose rights have been abused by
police misconduct.8 9
II. ALLOW EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS TO BE ADMITTED
DURING THE CASE-IN-CHIEF
The philosophy underlying a criminal trial is that each crime must be
considered apart from its perpetrator. The fact that a defendant has
been guilty of a hundred similar crimes is usually deemed by the courts
to be as irrelevant as the fact that until this accusation the defendant has
led a completely blameless life.60 The prosecution can thus ordinarily in-
57. See Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966); Foote, Tort Remedies
for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REv. 493 (1955); Note, 83
HARv. L. REv. 684 (1970); Comment, Lawless Law Enforcement, 4 Loy. L.A.
L. REv. 161 (1970); Note, The Federal Injunction as a Remedy for Unconstitutional
Police Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 143 (1968).
58. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens the United States Supreme Court recognized
that an individual could bring an action against federal agents who violated the
individual's Fourth Amendment rights. An undecided question, however, is whether
the government can claim immunity when such an action is maintained.
59. If the Supreme Court persists in finding the Mapp decision to be based upon the
Fourth Amendment as made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause, Congress should, in that event, preempt the field by legis-
lating a remedy for the innocent party whose Fourth Amendment rights have been
violated by either state or federal agents. Power to legislate a federal remedy is found
in § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment which provides: "The Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
60. See, e.g., Lane v. Warden, 320 F.2d 179, 181 (4th Cir. 1963); Railton v.
United States, 127 F.2d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 1942); 1 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENcE § 194
(3d ed. 1940). See also People v. Kelley, 66 Cal. 2d 232, 238-39, 424 P.2d 947, 953
(1967); State v. Cote, 108 N.H. 290, 294, 235 A.2d 111, 114 (1967).
Strangely, "character evidence" is not evidence of a defendant's character but is
evidence of his good reputation in the community. E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF
EVIDENCE 200-05 (1962). If the witness possesses knowledge of the defendant's
reputation for being law abiding, he is competent; however, if the witness knows from
personal experience that the defendant is law-abiding, i.e., has a law-abiding character,
the witness is not competent to testify.
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troduce no direct evidence of the accused's prior convictions.0 There-
fore, if a recidivist defendant decides not to testify, the trier of fact can
never be informed of the nature of his checkered past.
To overcome some of the inherent infirmities presented by the evi-
dential exclusion of a defendant's previous criminal record a legal fic-
tion has been created. If a defendant elects to testify in his own stead
(which, of course, he need not do), the prosecutor is permitted to in-
quire whether he has been convicted previously of a crime.0 2  If the
accused admits to conviction for the offense or offenses, that ends the
matter. If he denies the convictions, the prosecutor is enabled to prove
them. In either event, the trier of fact learns of the criminal back-
ground of the defendant. The theory underlying the fiction is that
prior convictions are relevant to a defendant's disposition to tell the
truth, particularly if the accused has in the past been convicted of a
crime involving dishonesty, such as perjury.(3  However, no logical
argument can be marshalled to support the belief that a once-convicted
robber will lie under oath while a first time offender-perhaps charged
with perjury-will speak the truth. 64 It is just as likely, considering
the stakes involved, that every defendant in a criminal case will stretch
the truth, if provided the chance, in order to promote his interests. On
the other hand, if the defendant has a history which demonstrates a dis-
regard for the law, this background is relevant to the credibility of the
61. Certain limited exceptions are made when the evidence is relevant to the proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560-61 (1967); PROP. FED. R.
Evm. 404(b) (Rev. Draft March 1971); E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE
213-14 (1962). See also Note, Evidentiary Use of Prior Felony Convictions, 21
HAST. L.J. 968 (1970) which discusses Shorter v. United States, 412 F.2d 428 (9th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1012 (1969) (defendant who himself offered evi-
dence of his prior convictions cannot complain that since said convictions were al-
legedly obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, they should be excluded).
62. E.g., CAL. Evm. CODE § 788 (West 1970); see E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF
EVIDENCE 74-75 (1962). A defendant with a long line of previous convictions may
escape the adverse effect of their disclosure by simply not taking the stand. See
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
63. C. MCCORmICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 43 (1954); E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS
OF EVIDENCE 74-75 (1962); Note, Evidentiary Use of Prior Felony Convictions, 21
HAST. L.J. 968, 971 (1970).
It is significant that the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, which undoubtedly
will affect many state evidentiary revisions, do not limit impeachment by prior convic-
tion to those convictions which involved dishonesty. PROP. FED. R. Evm. 609(a)
(Rev. Draft March 1971).
64. 3 J. WIGMOan, EVIDENCE §§ 920-30 (3d ed. 1940); C. McCoRMICK, LAw OF
EVIDENCE § 44 (1954); Ladd, Techniques and Theory of Character Testimony, 24 IOWA
L. REV. 498 (1939).
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government's case, especially if the defendant has been convicted for
the same or a similar crime to the one charged.65
It is illogical to allow the jury to decide the credibility of a defend-
ant witness with his criminal record but not permit the credibility of the
government's case to be adjudged with the same information. Yet
whenever evidence of a defendant's prior criminal conviction is ad-
duced to impeach, the jury is afterwards instructed to consider the prior
only in assessing the accused's veracity and never in substantiating his
guilt.66 The jury is assumed to be capable of drawing this fine dis-
tinction-a supposition which is totally unfounded.67  Moreover, the
65. The language of the New Hampshire Supreme Court in State v. Duke, 100
N.H. 292, 123 A.2d 745 (1956), is worthy of mention:
We are aware of the arguments for a rule which would limit impeachment...
to crimes directly involving lack of veracity .... It seems to us that such a rule
represents too narrow and artificial a view. The object of a trial is not solely to
surround an accused with legal safeguards but also to discover the truth. What a
person is often determines whether he should be believed. When a defendant
voluntarily testifies in a criminal case, he asks the jury to accept his word. No
sufficient reason appears why the jury should not be informed what sort of person
is asking them to take his word. In transactions of everyday life this is probably
the first thing that they would wish to know. So it seems to us in a real sense
when a defendant goes into the stand, "he takes his character with him."...
Lack of trustworthiness may be evidenced by his abiding and repeated contempt
for laws which he is legally and morally bound to obey . . . though the viola-
tions are not concerned solely with crimes involving "dishonesty and false state-
ment." Id. at 294, 123 A.2d at 746.
See also 1 J. WboMoa, EVIDENCE § 216 (3d ed. 1940).
66. E.g., 1 E. DEviTr & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS
§ 12.09 (1970) which reads:
Evidence of a defendant's previous conviction of a felony is to be considered
by the jury, only insofar as it may affect the credibility of the defendant as a
witness, and must never be considered as evidence of guilt of the crime for which
the defendant is on trial.
67. A recent survey of national scope showed that 98 per cent of the attorneys and
43 per cent of the judges who responded did not believe a jury was capable of follow-
ing an instruction to consider prior convictions evidence only as bearing upon a de-
fendant's credibility and not as evidence of his guilt. Note, To Take the Stand or Not
To Take the Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant With a Criminal Record, 4
COLUm. J. LAw & Soc. PROB. 215, 218 (1968). Other jury investigations undertaken
by the University of Chicago underscore this point. The examination disclosed that
jurors have an
"almost universal inability and/or unwillingness either to understand or follow the
court's instruction on the use of defendant's prior criminal record for impeach-
ment purposes. The jurors almost universally used defendant's record to conclude
that he was a bad man and hence was more likely than not guilty of the crime for
which he was then standing trial." Letter from Dale W. Broeder, Associate Pro-
fessor, the University of Nebraska College of Law, who conducted the inter-
views, to Yale Law Journal, dated March 7, 1960, quoted in Note, Other Crimes
and Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763, 777
(1961) (footnote omitted).
Cf. Justice Jackson's oft-quoted comment in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S.
440, 453 (1949) (concurring opinion) (citation omitted): 'The naive assumption
that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury . . . all practicing
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present state of the law penalizes a defendant who takes the stand to
defend himself, but rewards a defendant who refuses to testify.08 The
impeachment exception to the exclusion of priors has been shown to ad-
versely affect the accused since its use inhibits him from testifying.0 9
If priors were made admissible during the government's case-in-chief,
with reasonable guidelines regulating their introduction, 0 this inhibi-
tion would disappear.
In other countries evidence proffered to show a penchant of the de-
fendant for illicit activity is accepted under the belief that one should be
judged to some extent by his background. 71  The validity of this con-
cept is irrecusable since an accused's past criminal conduct is material to
a determination of whether he is guilty of an act similar to that for
which he now protests his innocence. Statistics on recidivism belie the
assumption underlying the American rule that a previously convicted
person is no more likely to commit a crime than a person accused of his
first offense.72 Once a person commits a crime his propensity for com-
lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction." See also C. McCoRMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 43, at 93-94, § 53 at 122-23 (1954).
68. A survey has indicated that a defendant with a prior criminal record of which
the jury is aware is almost twice as likely to be convicted as is a defendant without a
criminal record or with one which is concealed from the jury. H. KALVEN & H.
ZEISEL, THE AMERiCAN JURY 160-61 (1966). Therefore a defendant with prior con-
victions who decides to testify exposes himself to an increased possibility of convic-
tion.
69. Defendants with a history of past offenses are generally advised by their attorneys
not to testify and thus preclude the damaging admission of their prior convictions. See
Note, To Take the Stand or Not To Take the Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant
With a Criminal Record, 4 COLUM. J. LAW & Soc. PROB. 215, 220-21 (1968). How-
ever, it must be conceded that if an accused fails to testify, the jurors notice and tend to
consider his silence as an affirmation of guilt. See authorities collected in Note, To
Take the Stand or Not to Take the Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant With a Crin-
inal Record, 4 CoLUM. J. LAw & Soc. PRoD. 215, 221-22 (1968).
70. An example of fair guidelines for admitting priors as impeachment evidence is
PROP. FED. R. EviD. 609 (Rev. Draft March 1971). These guidelines could be
followed for the admission of priors during the case-in-chief. See also People v.
Beagle, 6 Cal. 3d 441, 492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972) (trial judge has discretion
to exclude evidence of prior felony conviction offered to impeach when the probative
evidence as to credibility is outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice).
71. See R. DAviD & H. DEVRm, THE FRENCH LEGAL SysTEM 77 (1958) which states:
And Anglo-American lawyers may be surprised to learn that issues of reasonable
doubt in criminal cases may be resolved by evidence and argument bearing on
prior convictions of the accused, his general behavior, even his family history.
See also GERMAN CODE CRIM. PROC. § 243 (H. Niebler transl. 1965); G. WMLIAMS,
THE PROOF OF GuILT 213-14 (3d ed. 1963).
72. See UNwOEm CRiME REPORTS, supra note 2, at 37-41. The report details the
result of a four year study, 1965-69, of recidivism. Illustrative is the following ex-
cerpt:
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mitting a second crime measurably increases."3 The likelihood that a
convicted lawbreaker will later repeat his crime is statistically predicta-
ble, 74 and evidence relating the statistical probability should be per-
mitted.75 Such evidence is relevant to ascertaining what, at the least,
is manifest to the jury as a subliminal issue-the defendant's character. 0
The probability that the defendant may have committed the offense
charged may be as relevant as whether fruits of the crime were found in
his possession.
To make information relating to a defendant's prior offenses mean-
When criminal repeating is viewed by type of crime for which arrested, con-
victed, or released in 1965, rearrests ranged from 16 percent for the income tax
violators to 80 percent of the auto thieves. The predatory crime offenders had
high repeat rates with 76 percent of the burglars being rearrested within 4 years,
68 percent of assault offenders, and 57 percent of the robbers released in 1965.
Likewise, 69 percent of the narcotic offenders who are frequently users were re-
arrested after release. The fact that 67 percent of the forgery offenders were
rearrested for new violations within the 4-year follow-up, documents law enforce-
ment experience with this type offender. Id. at 39.
Although the UNInoRM CRIME REPORTS cumulate only rearrest figures and not recon-
viction figures, the correlation is readily translated since one-half of all arrests lead
to convictions. See note 3 supra.
73. Cf. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560-61 (1967); Uniform Crime Reports,
supra note 2, at 37:
A summary of 37,884 offenders arrested on federal charges in 1970 is set
forth. .. . Of these offenders, 25,909 or 68 percent had previously been ar-
rested on a criminal charge.
These 37,884 offenders had an average criminal career of 5 years and 5 months
(span of years from first to last arrest). During this time they were arrested on
criminal charges an average of four times each for a total of 158,000 charges.
These offenders had a total of 52,936 convictions and 22,240 imprisonments of
6 months or more during their crime careers prior to their arrest in 1970.
74. See generally UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 2, at 37-42.
75. See Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83
HARv. L. REv. 489 (1970). Although the article deals with identification evidence, the
mathematical model discussed by Finkelstein and Fairley could be applied to calculate
the probability of a defendant's recidivism since this is identification evidence of a sort.
This information could then be assessed by the trier of fact in conjunction with the
rest of the evidence introduced.
Probability statistics on recidivism could be calculated with more accuracy than
could run-of-the-mine identification evidence since recidivism statistics would be based
upon generality of information rather than a particularity of information which necessi-
tates a difficult mathematical translation. This is a significant difference even in
light of the broadened admissibility of expert testimony suggested by the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence. See PROP. FED. R. EviD. §§ 702-05 (Rev. Draft March
1971).
76. Of course, an accused would be given a chance to offer statistical evidence re-
butting the likelihood of his present guilt from proof of his prior convictions. This
would mollify to some degree even those who oppose the use of mathematics in the
fact-finding process. See, e.g., Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in
the Legal Process, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1329, 1377 n.155 (1971).
77. Suppose that the defendant is being prosecuted for forgery in connection with the
use of another person's credit card, that he has three prior credit card forgery convic-
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ingful, the trier of fact could receive evidence which adduced the statis-
tical probability, considering all relevant circumstances, 78 that com-
mission of those crimes would lead to the perpetration of the malefac-
tion charged. Coupling the priors with statistical evidence would en-
sure that a trier of fact would not rely upon a personalized and un-
realistic conception of their importance. 7  If priors were given a con-
crete statistical treatment, then jurors could weigh the statistical evidence
with the other evidence presented in arriving at their decision.80 In-
deed, the use of probability statistics could help a jury attach some
meaning to the phrase "beyond a reasonable doubt" and thereby in-
sure greater precision in the deliberative function. 81
The statutes in most states would require amending to allow the ad-
mission of prior convictions as evidence during the case-in-chief.82  The
United States Supreme Court, however, in Spencer v. Texas83 upheld
a Texas recidivist procedure which permitted the jury to receive infor-
mation of an accused's prior convictions during the trial when it was
incumbent upon the jury to decide punishment as well as guilt8 4 One
tions, and that at the time of his arrest goods which matched the description of those
received as a product of the forgery are discovered. If human conclusion reaching is
a probabilistic process as Professor Ball suggests (see Ball, The Moment of Truth:
Probability Theory and Standards of Proof, 14 VAND. L. Rnv. 807 (1961) ), then
surely the probability of recidivism in this case (see UNmFom CRimE REPoRTs, supra
note 2, at 38) is more relevant to a jury than the identity of the goods, particularly
if they are of commonplace nature.
78. Relevant circumstances would obviously include the number of prior convic-
tions, the nature of prior convictions, the sex of the defendant, the recency of prior
convictions, etc. Although it may be argued that these statistics are too subjective to
be significant, courts have allowed the use of statistics even when subjective factors are
involved. A prime example is the mortality table. What could be more subjective
than estimating the length of a given person's life?
79. See Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83
H. v. L. Rnv. 489, 517 (1970) which concludes:
[A] juror forced to derive a quantitative measure of his suspicion on the basis of
evidence at trial is likely to consider that evidence more carefully and rationally,
and to exclude impermissible elements such as appearance or popular prejudice.
80. Moreover, Bayesian analysis would demonstrate that the evidentiary weight of
an impressive figure like one in a thousand-which might otherwise exercise an
undue influence-would depend on the other evidence in the case, and might
well be relatively insignificant. . . . Id.
81. See Finkelstein & Fairley, A Comment on "Trial By Mathematics", 84 HARV.
L. REv. 1801, 1809 &n.44 (1971).
82. See C. McCoRMIc, LAw OF EVDENCE. § 43, at 89 (1954).
83. 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
84. Recidivist statutes have been sustained against various contentions that they are
constitutionally infirm. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962) (due process); Gryger v.
Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948) (double jeopardy); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S.
616 (1912) (double jeopardy, due process, equal protection, privileges and immunities,
cruel and unusual punishment); McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (1901)
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obvious method of permitting evidence of a defendant's prior record
during the government's case is to enact a statute which commissions
the jury to determine punishment immediately upon their reaching a
guilty verdict. This places the statute within the perimeters of Spen-
cer,"5 but such an approach could cause other problems.8" A more di-
rect approach would be to allow the admission of a defendant's prior
convictions as well as evidence of the statistical probability of his recid-
ivism during the case-in-chief.8 7  The use of priors, when joined with
the statistical probabilities of a defendant's recidivism, would serve well
in limiting jury speculation concerning the probability of the defend-
ant's guilt; this type of speculation, it must be assumed, occurs now
when the defendant is impeached by priors.88 The defendant would
be given the chance to rebut and, moreover, would not feel restrained
by fear of impeachment from testifying. To safeguard against the
possibility that the jury would determine guilt on this evidence alone
and not from the other evidence adduced, the jury could be admonished
that the probability statistics can never constitute proof sufficient to
warrant conviction in a criminal case and must be treated accordingly. 89
(ex post facto, equal protection, trial by jury, double jeopardy, cruel and unusual pun-
ishment); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673 (1895) (privileges and immunities, due
process, equal protection, double jeopardy, cruel and unusual punishment).
85. 385 U.S. at 559-62 (1967).
86. Typical of these would be sentencing, which would suffer from jury inexperience
and lack of consistency. In addition, the jury would not have the benefit of a probation
report which considered and analyzed information either inadmissible or unavailable at
the time of trial. The trial judge has the benefit of such a probation report containing
pertinent information which allows him to employ the modem penological concept of
individualized punishment. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246-49 (1949).
87. A less direct method of admitting an accused's prior record during the prosecu-
tion's case-in-chief is to construe liberally evidence of other crimes and admit it for some
purpose other than merely to prove that the accused is the sort of individual who
would be likely to commit the offense for which he is charged. Cf. C. McCoRMIcK,
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 157, at 326-31 (1954).
See Note, Procedural Protections of the Criminal Defendant-A Reevaluation of the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Rule Excluding Evidence of Propensity to
Commit Crime, 78 HAv. L. Rv. 426, 449 (1964) wherein it is remarked:
Granting the prosecutor the opportunity to introduce relevant propensity evidence
should reduce the pressure upon him to exploit every opportunity to introduce
prejudicial evidence, and also reduce the tolerance that judges and legislatures
have shown toward questionable evidence rules.
88. See note 68 supra.
89. See Finkelstein & Fairley, A Comment on "Trial by Mathematics", 84 HARv.
L REV. 1801, 1805 (1971) wherein the authors state that "[tihe purpose of Bayesian
techniques, as we propose them, is to assist the fact-finder in interpreting statistical
evidence...." It must be noted that should only statistical evidence be offered, how-
ever, it probably would be accorded little, if any, weight. See, e.g., 1 E. DEvrrr & C.
BLAcKMAR, FEDERAL JuRY PRACnCE AND INSTRUCTiONS § 11.34 (2d ed. 1970):
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Although there is nothing prohibiting the jury from disregarding this
instruction, there is again nothing whatever to stop them from disre-
garding any other instruction the judge gives. Indeed, this is one of
the dangers of the jury system.9
III. ABOLISH TRIAL BY JURY
Trial by jury in criminal cases almost since its inception has been
regarded as the mainstay of the criminal justice system.91 However, in
this era when even the most fundamental traditions are subject to critical
reexamination, all institutions must be able to justify their existence
not by history alone but by their continued ability to meet the felt
needs of the people. A judicial system which facilitates the speedy and
efficient condemnation of the guilty without significantly impairing the
protections afforded the innocent is a major contemporary requirement
(or felt need of the public. There is little to indicate the petit jury
system is conducive to attaining this goal and, indeed, its use seems to
be dysfunctional.
The pros and cons of the jury system have been widely debated,
2
and, despite the supposed sacrosanct nature of the institution, many
If a party offers weaker and less satisfactory evidence when stronger and more
satisfactory evidence could have been produced, you may view the evidence
offered with suspicion.
(You must remember, however, that the defendant is not obliged to produce
any evidence or to call any witnesses.)
90. The full panoply of objections to the jury system is discussed in the following
proposal.
91. See, e.g., Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34, 44-45 (5th Cir. 1966).
92. For a partial listing of critical comment see H. KALVEN & H. ZuIsnL, THE
AMERICAN JURY 4 n.2 (1966); Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate the Ad-
ministration of the Internal Security Act of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. at 63-81 (Bibliography 1955). The jury system has been criticized on
the ground that voir dire, originally intended to eliminate bias from the jury, has been
denigrated into a delaying tactic. Braswell, Voir Dire-Use and Abuse, 7 WAIM
FoREST L. REv. 49, 56-57 (1970); Craig, Erickson, Friesen & Maxwell, Voir Dire:
Criticism and Comment: A Discussion, 47 DENVER L.J. 465, 477-78 (1970). That
voir dire has failed to eliminate bias, or at least that it still exists, is admitted even
by supporters of the jury system. Powell, Jury Trials of Crimes, 23 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 1, 4 (1966). Social, economic and racial loading of the jurybox is not
only the goal of some attorneys (see Braswell supra) but is also the intrinsic effect
of the manner of selection of the jurors. See generally H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL,
THE AMERICAN JURY 29-30 (1966); STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON IMPROVEMENTS
IN JtUDICIAL MACHINERY OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 90TH CONG., IST SESS.,
REPORT ON FEDERAL JURY SELECTION (1967); Mills, A Statistical Profile of Jurors
in a United States District Court, 1969 L. & Soc. ORDER 329; Mills, A Statistical
Study of Occupations of Jurors in a United States District Court, 22 MD. L. REV. 205
(1962).
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eminent authorities have been scathing in their condemnation of it.93
Indeed, the law itself seems to cast doubt upon the efficacy of the jury
system. Juries are regarded under the law as unable to properly as-
sess items of proof. Elaborate and therefore time consuming rules
have been designed to exclude certain evidence from the considera-
tion of the jury." The law considers the juror incapable of separating
either the trial judge's personal opinion of the merits of the case
from the court's opinion of the sufficiency of the evidence presented, 95
or the juror's own biases from an objective consideration of the facts.96
The law does not trust the jury not to resort to unfair methods of de-
cision,97 or to exercise its fact-finding duty competently, 98 or even to
93. The most noted judicial critic was, of course, Judge Jerome Frank. See J.
FRNKX, CoURTs ON TRAL 126-45 (1949), wherein the author characterizes the jury
as the "quintessence of governmental arbitrariness" and points out that the jury system
"almost completely wipes out the principle of 'equality before the law."' Id. at 132.
Interestingly, he suggests as one of the methods of improving the system a revision of
the exclusionary evidence rules. Id. at 143-44. See also G. WLLIAS, THm PROOF OF
GUILT 327-28 (3d ed. 1963) wherein the author notes:
It may be taken, then, that in one way or another the jury system tends to the
acquittal of criminals who if tried under a purely professional system would be
convicted. This is not a defect that the lawyer by his training can readily ap-
preciate. Yet it is an evil when a guilty person is acquitted: Not only may a
dangerous criminal be turned loose on society, but the efficacy of punishment as
a system of general deterrence is impaired; also if social agencies can do anything
for the rehabilitation of a criminal, the sooner he is convicted of his offenses the
better.
94. The often maligned hearsay rules are prime examples of the law's practice of
excluding certain kinds of evidence from the jury's consideration. See, e.g., CAL.
Evm. CODE §§ 1200-1341 (West 1968); PROP. FED. R. EviD. §§ 801-06 (Rev. Draft
March 1971). It should be noted, however, that the trial judge is given the discretion
to exclude otherwise competent evidence if he finds that admission of the evidence would
unduly prejudice a party or mislead the jury. See, e.g., CAL. Evm. CODE § 352
(West 1968); CAL. PFN. CODE ANN. § 1044 (West 1970). The obvious conclusion to be
drawn from these code sections is that a juror, unlike the judge, is deemed unable to
distinguish weak from strong evidence, nor is he deemed able to avoid being prejudiced
by the tenor of the evidence.
95. For example, motions for acquittal are made out of the presence of the jury.
Were the judge to rule against the defendant in the presence of the jury, it is assumed
that the jury would conclude that the judge believes the defendant is guilty.
96. A juror may, of course, be excused for "legal cause" when shown to be biased
against the cause or a party. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 602 (West Supp.
1970-71); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879); Fitts v. Southern Pac. Co.,
149 Cal. 310, 86 P. 710 (1906).
97. A wealth of cases have been appealed on the ground that the verdict was one of
chance or quotient. See, e.g., Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 335 (1966); 53 AM. JuR. Trial
§§ 1029, 1030 & n.4 (1945).
98. In California the trial court must, if any party so requests, make preliminary
determinations of foundational material out of the presence of the jury. CAL. Evm.
CODE § 402 (West 1968). Other jurisdictions leave to the discretion of the trial
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be able to disregard facts only reported and not proved. 9 Moreover,
the jury system in a sense prostitutes the professionalism of the attorneys
appearing before it,100 abets the commission of prejudicial error by the
court," and adds nothing progressive to the course of the law.10 2
At issue, then, is whether the ability of the jury in its present configu-
ration to satisfy systemic requirements so far exceeds the ability of the
simpler and less costly alternative methods to be suggested herein to
satisfy those same requirements as to justify the continued use of this
otherwise cumbersome and dysfunctional means of adjudication of fact
and guilt.
No advantage in obtaining a "speedy trial" redounds to the individual
who is tried by jury. By its very nature the jury trial requires an amount
of time exceeding that required for non-jury trials because of the neces-
sity to voir dire the jury, to physically remove the selected veniremen
from the courtroom for the many hearings which occur in the course of
the average trial and which must be heard out of the jury's presence, 0
and the tendency of attorneys to engage in extensive, time-consuming
speeches in their opening statements and summations when given the
audience of a jury.10 4 Yet no "judge time" is saved since the presence of
a judicial officer is required in both jury and court trials-indeed, more
judicial time is expended in the former than in the latter. Nor have
jurors been shown to be more able fact finders than a single judge. 05
Defenders of the jury system often rely upon the "dispensing func-
tion" of the jury as the principal reason for retaining the system.' 0 6
court whether to conduct an inquiry in the presence of the jury. See PROP. FED. R.
EviD. § 104 (Rev. Draft March 1971).
99. Of particular concern is the problem of pretrial publicity. See, e.g., Irvin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). Oftimes a juror asserts impartiality notwithstanding his
bias caused by adverse publicity to one of the parties. However, if the court retains
any lingering doubts about a juror's impartiality, the juror should be excused. See,
e.g., State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 987
(1965).
100. See text accompanying notes 113-18 infra.
101. See text accompanying notes 118-22 infra.
102. See text accompanying notes 150-51 infra.
103. See notes 95 & 98 infra.
104. Studies of civil cases have shown that (1) the jury trial consumes nearly 40 per-
cent more time than a court trial; (2) the time of opening and closing statements is twice
as long; and (3) the taking of evidence is a third longer (and this excludes voir dire and
jury deliberation time). See, e.g., H. ZEIsEL, H. KALVEN & B. BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN
THE CoURTs 77-81 (1959). The analogy to criminal cases is clear.
105. H. KALVEN & H. ZEiSEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 168-81 (1966).
106. Everett v. United States, 336 F.2d 979, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Wright, J.,
dissenting). The dissent in Everett argued the defendant, charged with armed robbery,
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This function has been defined by Judge Charles Wyzanski as "the de-
vice by which the rigor of the law is modified pending the enactment of
new statutes.'10 7  Professor James has put it more frankly: "Juries
sometimes take the law into their own hands and decide a case according
to popular prejudice which often embodies popular notions of what the
law ought to be."'0 8  Dean Pound referred to the dispensing function
as simply "jury lawlessness."'1 9
The essence of this pro-jury argument is founded upon the obvious
antinomy that the injection of lawlessness, in Pound's words, into
a legal proceeding renders the proceeding more lawful. Implicit is the
assumption that a jury of twelve is more likely to comprehend chang-
ing social mores and needs than a single judge. This supposition has
long been refuted by empirical evidence which discloses that the average
jury is composed of persons who are Caucasian, middle or low-upper
class, male, and over forty years of age.'" Individuals with these char-
should be allowed to change his plea to innocent even though he admitted committing
the acts alleged. The dissent asserted that the defendant's claim "seems to make him
out as a modem Jean Vaijean. ... who should be permitted to bring his equities
before the jury's historical power to "acquit those whom it felt it unjust to call
criminal." Id. at 984, 986.
107. Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARv. L. REv.
1281, 1286 (1952).
108. James, Tort Law in Midstream: Its Challenge to the Judicial Process, 8 BUFF.
L. REv. 315, 342 (1959); see also G. WiLriAMS, ThE PROOF OF GUILT 260 (3d ed.
1963); Broeder, The Functions of the Jury-Facts or Fictions, 21 U. Cm. L. REv.
386, 413-417 (1947). This characteristic of the jury to "go their own way" is
admitted by the authorities. Justice Holmes stated: "The jury has the power to bring
in a verdict in the teeth of both the law and facts." Homing v. District of Columbia,
254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920). See also, 0. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 237-38
(1921); R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHmosoPHy OF LAW 133 (1922);
Traynor, Fact Skepticism & The Judicial Process, 106 PA. L. REv. 635, 639-40 (1958).
For a collection of cases exemplifying the application of this power see Howe, Juries as
Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HAv. L. REv. 582 (1939). In their monumental study of
the jury, Kalven and Zeisel came to the interesting conclusion regarding the abilities of
the jury that: "After studying these cases we shall come to think of the jury not so
much as an institution with a built-in protection for the defendant, but rather as an
institution which is stubbornly non-rule minded." H. KALVEN & H. ZeISEL, THE
AmemucAN JURY 375 (1966). Moreover, the court has no power to direct a verdict for
the state in a criminal case. See, e.g., Carter v. State, 204 Ga. 242, 49 S.E.2d 492
(1948).
109. Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 U.S.L. REv. 12, 18 (1910).
110. See, e.g., Mills, A Statistical Profile of Jurors in a United States District Court,
1969 L. & Soc. ORDER 329, 335, 337; Mills, A Statistical Study of Occupations of
Jurors in a United States District Court, 22 Mn. L. REv. 205 (1962). Interestingly,
THm AmRcA JURY, considered to be the most extensive study of the jury, made no
attempt to discover the socio-economic status of the jury. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL,
T E AMERICAN JURY 33-44 (1966).
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acteristics are often those most likely to harbor racial, religious and sex-
ual prejudices."' If the American system of justice is one "of laws and
not of men,""' it is inconceivable that such a system would find bedrock
not only in twelve ordinary men unschooled in the law, but, moreover, in
men apt to be more prone than any other class to obey their baser
instincts. Thus the "dispensing function" is merely a misleading euphe-
mism used to disguise reliance upon the social biases so long condemned
in other contexts. While judges may be subject to the same criticisms,
to sustain the present argument for abolition of the jury it is not neces-
sary to show that the non-jury system is better equipped for the criminal
process, but only that it is commensurate with the present system in its
utility.
The use of the petit jury in criminal cases has an adverse effect as
well upon the conduct of the attorneys appearing before it and upon
the decorum so essential to the social legitimacy of the judicial system.
Counsel, aware that they are addressing their arguments not to a single
law-trained man but to twelve lay persons, ineluctably reach the correct
conclusion that non-legal factors will influence the outcome. They
therefore attempt to play upon the jury with tendentious statements
and red herrings in derogation of the spirit, if not the law, of the trial
process."1
3
111. G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE chs. 25 & 26 (1954). See also G.
ALLPORT, THE PERSON IN PSYCHOLOGY 195-99 (1968); S. STOUFFER, THE AMERICAN
SOLDIER: ADJUSTMENT DuRING ARlMY LiFE (1944). It has also been shown that the
goal of impartiality is affected by the nature of the crime charged; convictions in-
crease with the degree of violence involved.
We may prate about acquitting nine guilty men rather than risk the conviction
of one innocent, but we in fact shudder at the idea of turning loose nine guilty
men capable of committing crimes of violence and grave depredation. If this be
true, as the balance is weighted more and more in favor of the wrongdoer,
there is likely to be a counterforce set up to accept less and less evidence as
sufficient to convict those charged with crimes of violence and grave depredation.
Breitel, Criminal Law and Equal Justice, 1966 UTAH L. Rrv. 1, 11.
This is a far cry from the desire that "tihe jury list should represent as high a de-
gree of intelligence, morality, integrity, and common sense as possible." THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, THE JURY SYSTEM IN THE FEDERA COURTS, 26
F.R.D. 409, 421 (1961). For the proposed remedies for failings in the jury selection
process, see REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYSTEM OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 42 F.R.D. 353 (1967).
112. MAss. BILL OF RIGiiTS art. XXX (1780), in DoCUmENTs OF AMmuCAN HISTORY
107-110 (H. Commager ed. 1963).
113. Prospective jurors are subjected to a battery of questions (voir dire) designed to
insure that they know neither the victim nor the defendant nor anyone else involved
in the proceeding. The course of voir dire forces prospective jurors to reveal, in addi-
tion to perhaps some embarrassing information, their identities. This latter, seemingly
innocuous disclosure may result in danger to their safety or that of their families from
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The voir dire of prospective jurors originated with the hope that it
would detect and prevent the impanelling of jurors biased in favor of
either party.1 14  Its effectiveness in this respect, however, is subject
to question; the desire of the attorneys conducting the voir dire has
been in contraposition to the espoused theory. 115 Witherspoon v. Illi-
nois" 6 indicates the ineffectiveness of judicial attempts to correct this
tendency. Prior to Witherspoon voir dire could be used to automati-
cally exclude from the jury any individuals who bore reservation to the
imposition of capital punishment. In Witherspoon the Supreme Court
concluded that exclusion from the jury "for cause" of any person who
expressed reservations other than an absolute inability to impose the
ultimate sanction or to render an impartial determination of guilt would
be a denial of due process to the defendant. 117  Empirical data shows,
however, that this test does not succeed in eliminating the jury bias
as sought by counsel in voir dire.118
"supporters" of the defendant. See United States v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20 (6th Cir.
1965), aff'd, 385 U.S. 295 (1966); United States v. Osborn, 350 F.2d 497 (6th Cir.
1965), aff'd, 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
Consider also, FnD. R. Cium. PRoc. 24(b) which grants each side 20 peremptory
challenges in a capital case. Moreover, the government receives six challenges and
the defendant (or defendants jointly) ten challenges if the offense is punishable by
imprisonment for more than 1 year. The advantage to a defendant seeking but a
solitary "hold out" juror is notable.
114. Braswell, Voir Dire: Use & Abuse, 7 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 49, 50 (1970).
See generally L. NIZER, MY LiFE IN COURT (1961); Holdaway, Voir Dire-A Neg-
lected Tool of Advocacy, 40 MiL. L. Rnv. 1 (1968); McGee, Selecting the Jury
in Criminal Cases-Some Common Law Aspects, 5 ALA. L. REv. 213 (1953);
Morril, Voir Dire Examination, 542 INs. L.J. 190, 191 (1968); Vance, Voir Dire Ex-
amination of Jurors in Federal Civil Cases, 8 VILL. L. REV. 76 (1962). Mr. Nizer
states that "once the jury is selected the outcome is decided ....... L. NJIZER, MY
LIFE fr COURT 36 (1961). Surely, this is not the justice originally sought to be imple-
mented by voir dire. See also State v. Allred, 275 N.C. 554, 559, 169 S.E.2d 833, 835
(1969). A discussion of FED. R. Cium. PROC. 24, its effects upon voir dire, and its
purpose may be found in the following: Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965);
Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1968); Hamer v. United States,
259 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1958).
115. "Utilization of the voir dire not merely to select an impartial jury but to influ-
ence the jurors in favor of the examining lawyer and his case has been accepted trial
tactics." Tone, Voir Dire, New Supreme Court Rule 24-1: How It Works, 47 flL.
B.J 140, 143 (1958); see ABA PROJECT ON MImum ST DARDs FOR CRimNAL
1USTICE, STANDARDs RELATING TO TRIAL By JURY Rule 2.4 & Commentary (1968).
Mere reading of the titles to the many articles on voir dire indicate that not fairness,
but prejudice of the jury, is the effect sought in voir dire. See, e.g., sources collected
note 114 supra.
116. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
117. Id. at 522-23 n.21. See also Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 482 (1970).
118. Jurow, New Data on the Effect of the "Death Qualified" fury on the Guilt
Determination Process, 84 HAXV. L. REv. 567, 588 (1971).
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The necessity for jury instructions illustrates another vexation of the
jury trial. Both the prosecution and defense have the opportunity to
propose jury instructions regarding the law applicable to the facts of
the case and may submit them to the court."' Counsel's intent, if he
is to properly represent his client, must be to construct proposed in-
structions which are as biased in his favor as possible without being
erroneous statements of the law. The judge has usually prepared
his own charge which closely follows language previously upheld as
acceptable by appellate courts, i.e., instructions that are not too con-
fusing or inaccurate. 120 Giving the proper charge is a difficult and try-
ing business for the judge. The procedure, however, provides another
filter for the defendant. Should the trial judge fail to read an instruc-
tion which the defendant has requested, he runs the risk of committing
error which may be ground for reversal of the defendant's conviction and
award of a new trial. 21' Accordingly, when he is in doubt a judge is in-
clined to bend over backward to favor the defendant since the govern-
ment typically cannot obtain a reversal of a jury acquittal for any reason
whatever. This includes any error of law the judge may make in favor-
ing instructions proposed by the defense.
A related factor which underlies the failure of the jury system to ac-
complish its desired ends is the complexity of the modern criminal trial.
"[Tihere are a lot of people who can read and write and can't under-
stand the kind of proceedings that go on in a courtroom.' 2 2  The
abolition of the jury system is mandated not only to rid ourselves of an
anachronism, but, in fact, to insure the impartial justice once thought
to be secured the defendant by the jury system.
Chief Justice Burger has underscored the way to remedy the burden
placed upon the court, the defendant and the prosecution by the pres-
ent jury system:
When we look at the administration of justice in such enlightened
countries as Holland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, we find some in-
teresting contrasts to the U.S. They have not found it necessary to es-
119. FED. R. CiUM. PRoc. 30. Moreover, some commentators have discounted the
influence of the judge's instructions on the jury, who may have already made up their
minds before the instructions are given.
120. Some of these standard instructions may be found in 1 E. DEvrrr & C. BLACK-
MAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSrRUCTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
121. See 1 MATLH=ws, How TO TRY A FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE 666 (1960); ABA,
PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
TRIAL BY JURY 139-42 (Tent. Draft 1968).
122. Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34, 41 (5th Cir. 1966) (quoting testi-
mony of Jury Commissioner shown on the record).
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tablish a system which makes a criminal trial so complex or drawn out
as it is in this country. They do not employ our system of 12 jurors.
Generally their trials are before three professional judges.
123
Abolition of the jury in all criminal cases, or at least in those cases in-
volving non-capital crimes, 2 4 and substitution of the widely employed
Continental system of a judge and two laymen, "assessors," the latter
being professionally trained fact-finders, could do much to alleviate the
shortcomings of the jury system without eliminating lay influence on the
judicial process. 120  This system would be more fair, more efficient and
less burdensome on the public. 2 '
In the alternative, if this proposal seems too abrupt, the exaction of
unanimity of decision should be repealed, at least on the state level,
and replaced by a majority verdict requirement. The elimination of
unanimity, moreover, is not a mere proposal but a fact in at least two
123. Burger, The Views of the Chief Justice, LIF., Aug. 7, 1970, at 26.
124. In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) the Supreme Court, holding that
a defendant had a right to a trial by jury for all "serious crimes," declared unconstitu-
tional the Louisiana practice of granting trial by jury only in cases where capital
punishment or imprisonment at hard labor might be imposed as sentences. "Serious
crimes" were later defined in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), as those
punishable by imprisonment for more than six months. There exists no right to a jury
trial for crimes punishable by less than six months imprisonment. Duncan and
Baldwin thus limit the right on the basis of possible length of imprisonment. Analysis
of these cases indicates that the choice of six months was merely an expression of his-
torical opinion, and there appears no reason why the right -to jury could not be further
limited on a capital or non-capital basis within the principles of Duncan.
125. This is the "intermediate solution" proposed by Williams. G. WILLrAMS, THE
PROOF OF GumT 299 (3d ed. 1963). His principal suggestion calls for decision by
three judges. Id. at 298. There is some support for an argument that such a substitute
for trial by jury is constitutionally permissible. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
at n.14 (1968). As to the abandonment of the jury on the Continent after unsuccess-
ful experiments with it, primarily due to ineffective definitions of the province of the
judge and of the jury, see G. WmrAMs, THE PROOF OF GturT 254-56 (3d ed.
1963) and H. KALVEN & H. ZEIsEL, THE AMERcIAN JUR 3 n.3 (1966).
Illustrative of the Continental system are the provisions of the GERMAN COURT OR-
GANIZ ATON LAW §§ 29, 30, 81, 82 and the GERmAN CODE CiM. PRoC. § 263 (H.
Niebler transl. 1965). See also Vouin, The Protection of the Accused in French Crimi-
nal Procedure, 5 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 1, 156, 159-64 (1956).
126. Abolition of trial by jury would also have a beneficial effect on the appellate
process. Criminal cases typically involve issues of credibility, something considered to
be the province of the jury. Accordingly, an appellate court which never views the
witness cannot ordinarily substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court, but
must, if it reverses, order a new trial before another jury. See, e.g., CAL. PEN.
CODE §§ 1179-1182 (West Supp. 1971). Without the impediment of a jury trial re-
quirement the appellate court would be able to decide the case itself if a rehearing is
necessary. Where an issue of credibility is crucial, there would be nothing to prevent
the appellate court from calling an important witness (or all of them, should it desire)
rather than send the case back to the trial court for retrial and possibly a new appeal.
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states, Oregon2 7 and Louisiana," and has the approval of the Ameri-
can Law Institute' as well as of the highest courts of those statesY1 0
The underlying rationale for the rule of unanimity is grounded on the
requirement of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If there is
but one dissent in twelve, this is held dispositive that there exists a
reasonable doubt of a defendant's guilt.'81 The rationale is patently
erroneous and equates the quantity of "believers" with the quality of be-
lief. However, in the incipient stages of the criminal justice system just
such a rationale was acknowledged as the basis of the standard of
proof. 1
2
The constitutional question presented by this proposal is whether
the unanimity requirement is a fundamental right of due process ap-
plicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, as is presently
the right to trial by jury in serious crimes. 13 There is no reason to
believe unanimity is such a right, and the Supreme Court apparently so
held as early as 1903. 34 This declaration has never been condemned
127. The Oregon constitution provides:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to public trial by an
impartial jury ...provided, however, that in the circuit court ten members of
the jury may render a verdict of guilty or not guilty, save and except a verdict of
guilty of first degree murder, which shall be found only by a unanimous verdict.
• .. ORE. CoNsT. art. I § 11.
128. The Louisiana constitution provides that:
[C]ases, in which the punishment is necessarily at hard labor, [shall be tried) by a
jury of twelve, nine of whom must concur to render a verdict. LA. CONST. art.
VII § 41.
129. The American Law Institute's Code of Criminal Procedure provides:
In capital cases no verdict may be rendered unless all the jurors concur in it.
In other cases of felony a verdict concurred in by five-sixths of the jurors, and
in cases of misdemeanor a verdict concurred in by two-thirds of the jurors may
be rendered. A.L.I., CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDMM § 355 (1931).
The Oregon statute is based on the A.L.I. code. State v. Gann, 254 Ore. 549,
463 P.2d 570, 577 (1969).
130. State v. Apodaca, 1 Ore. App. 483, 462 P.2d 691, appeal denied, 89 Adv. Ore.
939 (1969), cert. granted, 400 U.S. 901 (1970); State v. Gann, 254 Ore. 549, 463 P.2d
570 (1969); Johnson v. Louisiana, 255 La. 314, 230 So. 2d 825 (1970), prob. juris.
noted, 400 U.S. 900 (1970); State v. Schoonover, 252 La. 311, 211 So. 2d 273
(1968).
131. S. PROFFATr, JuRy TRiAL 117 (1877).
132. Sir Patrick Devlin of Britain has analyzed the requirement of unanimity and
found it to be based upon the ancient common law custom of deciding cases according
to the preponderance of the number of witnesses appearing in support of each side.
Twelve were required to support the prevailing party and they were, of course, unani-
mous in their opinions. P. DEvLrN, TRiAL BY JuRy 48 (1956).
133. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), and Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
194 (1968), hold that the right to trial by jury in serious cases is guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. See also text accompanying notes 143 & 144 infra.
134. Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 217-18 (1903). In Mankichi the laws of
the Republic of Hawaii, recently ceded to the United States, provided for conviction
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by the Court and, indeed, the indications are that it will not be over-
ruled. In Duncan v. Louisiana,' which extended the guarantee of
trial by jury to the states, Justice White, speaking for the Court, noted
that the decision would not require widespread changes in the state pro-
cedures. 13 6  Justice Fortas, specially concurring in Duncan, wrote: "I
see no reason whatever . . . to assume that our decision today should
require us to impose . . . requirements such as unanimous verdicts or
a jury of 12 upon the states. '' lar The Court has adopted the tack
of avoiding any ruling on the question in cases heard after Dun-
can,'3 8 although it is possible that a ruling will be made during
the October 1971 term.139 There is, however, no reason for specu-
-lation that the Court will depart from its 1903 ruling. The re-
quirement of unanimity has historically been the subject of criti-
cism; 40 it has been abolished in Great Britain,' 41 and less than unani-
mous verdicts have not been shown to lead to a miscarriage of justice.
42
A requirement which harnesses one party with the task of persuading
twelve jurors while the other party must carry the burden of persuading
but one is inequitable and ought not be retained.
Total abolition of the jury will, of course, require more than a jejune
by nine out of twelve jurors. The Court there held that majority verdict laws did not
violate any rights deemed "fundamental" under either the Fifth or Sixth Amendments.
Cf. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
135. 391 U.S. 145, reh. denied, 392 U.S. 947 (1968).
136. Id. at 158.
137. Id. at 162.
138. See DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 635 (1968) (express challenge to a
ten-to-two verdict under the Oregmn statute on Duncan principles held not to apply
since trial conducted prior to Duncan); State v. Schoonover, 252 La. 311, 211 So. 2d
273, cert. denied, 394 U.S. 931 (1968) (express challenge to the Louisiana statute).
Obviously, the principle of retroactivity would not necessarily have precluded decisions
in these cases had the Court wished to rule on them.
139. Johnson v. Louisiana, 255 La. 314, 230 So. 2d 825 (1970), prob. juris. noted,
400 U.S. 900 (1970) (affirming conviction by a 9-3 verdict under Louisiana constitu-
tion article 7, section 41); State v. Apodaca, 1 Ore. App. 483, 462 P.2d 691, appeal
denied, 89 Adv. Ore. 939 (1969), cert. granted, 400 U.S. 901 (1970) (per curiam
affirmance of less-than-unanimous felony conviction under Oregon constitution article
1, section 11 which permits a 10-2 conviction for any crime except first-degree mur-
der). In both cases, the question presented to the Court will be whether the Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial includes an absolute right to conviction by a unanimous
verdict.
140. P. DEVLiN, Tm R BY JuRY 48 (1956); Deady, Trial by Jury, U.S.L. Rnv. 398,
400 (1883); see generally notes 92 & 114 supra.
141. Criminal Justice Act of 1967, ch. 80 § 13.
142. Kalven & Zeisel, The American Jury, 48 Cm. B. Rnc. 195, 201 (1967). This
brief study was based upon a sampling of Oregon jury verdicts.
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reconstruction of constitutional provisions. 148  As a stopgap measure
pending more significant reform, all states should consider at least the
enactment of statutes containing provisions for less than unanimous
verdicts and for six rather than twelve man juries.144
IV. ALTER THE STANDARD OF PROOF
The protection of charged defendants, as well as service to the goals
of law enforcement, calls for substantially more evidence to establish a
criminal case by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Where is that evi-
dence? The crimes with which we are concerned are committed in
stealth and usually with premeditated cunning. It is rare that there are
available corroborative and uninvolved spectator witnesses. The trau-
matic shock of the crime usually unsettles the capacities for accurate ob-
servation by victim and witness alike.1
45
In order to prevail in a civil suit a party must establish his case by
the preponderance of the evidence.' 46 The veniremen impaneled for
the criminal trial, on the other hand, are constrained not to balance the
evidence, but to ascertain whether the government has introduced evi-
dence which proves its case "beyond a reasonable doubt."' 47  This con-
stitutes an invitation, despite the judge's inoulcations to the contrary, for
the jury to "hunt for doubts."'1 48 This sort of juror reaction is directly
143. Cf. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194
(1968). In Baldwin, the Court declared unconstitutional NEW YoRK CITY CRuM. COURT
Acr § 40 which provided for non-jury trial for offenses punishable by a maximum of
one year's imprisonment. The Court clearly indicated that jury trial is required for all
offenses punishable by a maximum penalty of over 6 months.
On the other hand, Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), held that a six-man
jury, rather than the typical twelve-man one, did not violate the right to trial by jury.
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion exposes the inconsistency between the Duncan,
Baldwin and Williams decisions. Id. at 136-38. Although his opinion suggests the re-
motely possible validity of a judge and two-assessor system, provided the assessors are
laymen, such a holding seems unlikely.
144. The Duncan and Williams cases both leave open the question of the constitu-
tionality of less than unanimous verdicts, and do not overrule Maxwell v. Dow, 176
U.S. 581 (1900), on the point that such a state procedure is permissible.
145. Breitel, Criminal Law and Equal Justice, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 1, 10.
146. See James, Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. REv. 51, 53 (1961). Preponderance of
the evidence was formerly the standard frequently applied in juvenile courts. See, e.g.,
Law of Apr. 27, 1965, ch. 37, fI [ 701-4, 704-6 [1965] ILL. REV. STAT. held uncon-
stitutional in In Re Urbasek, 38 Ill. 2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1967); LAws 1962,
ch. 686, N.Y. Family Court Act § 744(b) (eff. Sept. 1, 1962), held unconstitutional
in In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
147. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); see generally C. McCORMIcK, EviDENc E
§ 321 (1954); 9 J. WiMORtE, EViDENCE § 2497 (3d ed. 1940).
148. Cf. 1 E. Dnvrrr & C. BLAcKMAR, FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 11.01 (2d
ed. 1970).
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attributable to the chimerical quality of pattern instructions defining
"beyond a reasonable doubt." The standard definitions of "reasonable
doubt", even those commended as "models of clarity", force each juror
to become his own epistemologist. 149
There is good reason why a judge usually defines "reasonable doubt"
by an accepted rubric which is frequently incomprehensible."' Sup-
pose, for example, that during a jury trial a judge delivers a marginal
instruction on "reasonable doubt" which is subsequently challenged on
appeal. The appellate court must then examine the language used, set-
ting it forth in its opinion. If the opinion concludes that the given
charge is barely passable, and thus does not justify reversal, every
other trial judge knows he may safely employ the instruction since he is
not likely to be quickly reversed. Moreover, it is risky for a judge to
attempt to improve on accepted instructions because the appellate court
may then re-examine the language and find the new "improved" version
unacceptable. Consequently, the safest course is followed: Trial
judges use the marginal-but-sustained-on-appeal charge verbatim.
The most difficult requirement the prosecution must meet is proving
its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Although not all civilized coun-
149. See, e.g., State v. Centalonza, 18 N.J. Super. 154, 86 A.2d 780 (1952) wherein
the following charge was commended as a "model of clarity":
By a reasonable doubt is not meant a mere possible or imaginary doubt. It is
that state of the case where, after an examination and comparison of all the
evidence, or from a want of sufficient evidence, you cannot say that you feel an
abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge. That is ex-
pressing the thought in rather negative terms. To express the same thought in
positive terms: If, after an entire comparison and consideration of all the evi-
dence, you find you can say you feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty
of the truth of the charge, you are then satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
within the meaning of that term in the law. Id. at 158, 86 A.2d at 784.
Although perhaps clearer than most such charges, it is obvious that it will mean
different things to different auditors, and may well not be clear to them.
It should be noted in this connection that, although a more recent case, Regina v.
Murtagh, 39 Crim. App. 72 (1955), has again sanctioned the "reasonable doubt" in-
cantation, the British Court of Criminal Appeals ruled in 1952 that the expression
"reasonable doubt" should be abandoned because it could not be satisfactorily defined.
Regina v. Summers, 36 Crim. App. 14, 15 (1952). The simple charge of Summers
requiring only that the jury be "satisfied" that the defendant's guilt had been proved at
least had the virtue of simplicity.
150. The very indefiniteness of the term "reasonable doubt" raises a number of
issues. In civil cases where the preponderance test is used, the finder of fact is
often instructed in some detail on the burden of proof; yet in criminal cases there
is no such specification, even though "reasonable doubt" is a far more indefinite
term. Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. RaV.
1065, 1073 (1968).
It seems almost ludicrous that the courts would demand a standard which bounds on
being impossible to either understand or apply. No fundamental rights are preserved
when the factfinder is essentially left to float aimlessly on a sea of ambiguity.
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tries saddle the government with such an onerous standard of proof in a
criminal case,' 5' Americans have traditionally viewed the "reasonable
doubt" standard as the apotheosis of criminal justice. However,
[w]e may prate about acquitting nine guilty men rather than risk
the conviction of one innocent, but we in fact shudder at the idea of
turning loose nine guilty men capable of committing crimes of violence
and grave depredation. If this be true, as the balance is weighted
more and more in favor of the wrongdoer, there is likely to be a coun-
terforce set up to accept less and less evidence as sufficient to convict
those charged with crimes of violence and grave depredation. Any ex-
perience with the spate of testimonial records in the recent confession
cases, postconviction remedies, and illegal search and seizure suppres-
sions suggests that the courts and juries are paying lip service to Supreme
Court doctrine-on the law-but finding on the facts in favor of social
protection. 15
2
There may be no certainty that a jury would find it any easier to
understand and apply a "fair preponderance" standard in criminal
cases,'53 but this is an alternative standard which merits consideration,
151. Because France recognizes the presumption of innocence (R. DAvI & H. Du
VRsES, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 57 (1958); G. WILLIAMS, PROOF OF GUILT 183
(2d ed. 1955)), the "accused can only be condemned if proof is given of his guilt".
Vouin, The Protection of the Accused in French Criminal Procedure, 5 INT'L &
Com1,. L.Q. 157, 171 (1956). The only required proof of guilt is the "intime convic-
tion" of the judge of that guilt (Vouin, supra at 15), and later that of a jury (Vouin,
supra at 171) whose personal conviction can be formed on the basis of evidence not
ordinarily admissible in an American court. See also Vouin, supra at 171, as to
probative evidence which can be considered.
For the German practice see GER CODE CRIM. PROC. § 261 (H. Niebler transl.
1965) which provides: "With respect to the effect of the reception of the evidence,
the court decides according to its free conviction obtained from the entire trial."
It is worth noting that not even the English have been irrevocably wedded to the
"beyond-a-reasonable-doubt" standard. G. WILLIAMS, PROOF OF GUILT 190-94 (2d ed.
1955); see note 149 supra.
152. Breitel, Criminal Law and Equal Justice, 1966 UTAH L. REv. 1, 11. See also
D. BAZELON, The Adversary Process-Who Needs It?, 12th Annual James Madison
Lecture, New York University School of Law (April, 1971), reprinted in 117 CoNG.
Rnc. 5852, 5855 (daily ed. April 29, 1971) where Judge Bazelon stated: "[The
jurors, as representatives of the community, have the opportunity to inject into the
proceedings at hand their sense of the standards that prevail in the community."
153. See M. ROSENBERG, J. WEINSTEIN & H. SMIr, ELEMENTS OF CIvIL PROCEDURE
783-85 (2d ed. 1970); 1 E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 23 (1957).
Perhaps a "fair preponderance" charge would prove less difficult for a jury to grasp
if the instruction were attuned to probability concepts. A mathematical model based
upon a conscious legislative determination, in terms of probabilities, of the competing
interests ("utilities") of acquitting the guilty versus convicting the innocent, could be
devised and then translated into a comprehensible verbal formula. Such a formula
would be less apt to create that spurious certainty from numbers to which critics of
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particularly if the jury system is retained."" The maintenance of a jury
instruction which is out of tune with the beliefs of the selected venire-
men does nothing but foster disrespect for the integrity of our judicial
system.'
55
The higher the standard of proof required for conviction in a crimi-
nal case, the more likely it becomes that guilty men will be acquitted.
If the standard of proof were lessened from that of "reasonable doubt"
to "fair preponderance", fewer guilty would walk away free. This
might be accomplished by retaining the term "reasonable doubt" but
significantly changing the content of its present definition. 156  An an-
cillary advantage of this procedure would be the preservation of any
possible ritualistic and social value appended to the term "reasonable
doubt". Of course, it may be argued that any change would slightly in-
crease the probability that an innocent person would be convicted.157
Sufficient correctives for protection of the innocent (not available
when a guilty person has been improperly acquitted) exist, however, in
the trial judge's power to grant a new trial when he is convinced that
the defendant is in fact innocent, and in the jury's power of nullifica-
tion. "The jury clearly has an untrammeled power to disregard the
law, to refuse conviction even though the law plainly requires it .
if the rules of law do not square with their sense of justice. 159
Of more moment is the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in In re Winship'6° which explicitly held that proof of a defendant's
guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt" is mandated by due process and
is thus the standard which must be borne by the government in a crimi-
nal case.' 6" The implementation of a less severe standard of proof in
the use of mathematics in the trial process object. But see Tribe, Trial By Mathe-
matics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARv. L. R v. 1329 (1971).
154. But see text accompanying notes 91-144 supra.
155. See generally Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right To Say No, 45 S. CAL.
L. REV. 168 (1972).
156. Cf. Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REv.
1065, 1073-75 (1968). Again, the change in definition of "reasonable doubt" would
not wreak havoc. Breitel, supra note 152, at 11, declares: "[A]Ithough the standard
of proof for civil cases is less than that for criminal cases, the fact is that juries and
courts tolerate a level of proof in a criminal case that they would reject in a civil case."
157. Cf. Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof,
14 VAN. L. REV. 807 (1961).
158. D. BAZmLON, The Adversary Process-Who Needs It?, 12th Annual James Madi-
son Lecture, New York University School of Law (April, 1971), reprinted in 117
CONG. Rac. 5852, 5855 (daily ed. April 29, 1971).
159. Id. See also Breitel, supra note 152, at 11.
160. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
161. Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reason-
able-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process clause protects the
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a criminal case will require an about-face by the Court. Although
such a drastic action should not be expected with any immediacy, the
Supreme Court and Congress have recently undercut the pervasiveness
of the rule,' 6 2 and historical perspective underscores the necessity for
reevaluation.
The late Justice Black, dissenting in Winship, aptly pointed out:
"[M]any opinions of this Court indicate that it has long been as-
sumed that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is con-
stitutionally required.". . The Court has never clearly held, however,
that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is either expressly or impliedly
commanded by any provision of the Constitution. . . . [N]owhere in
that document [the Constitution] is there any statement that conviction
of crime requires proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 103
Justice Black, and impliedly the Court, indicate that the relevant in-
quiry into the burden of proof area is: Does history still support the em-
ployment of a reasonable doubt standard in a criminal trial as an ana-
logue of due process? Analysis will show that the dangers this standard
of proof was intended to overcome have long been rectified. There ap-
pears to be no current imperative reason why reasonable doubt is re-
quired as a standard of proof in order to satisfy due process. The
Court in Winship, and many courts prior to it, fell prey to the dangers
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. Id. at 364.
162. E.g., Lego v. Twomey, 92 Sup. Ct. Rptr. 619 (1972) (standard of proof in a
hearing on the voluntariness of a defendant's guilty plea need not be "beyond a reason-
able doubt").
In Title X of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575-78,
there is provision made for sentencing recidivists as dangerous special offenders.
Under § 3575 once a defendant either enters a plea consonant with an admission of
guilt or is determined by the trier of fact to be guilty, then a hearing is held (assuming
the defendant has been branded as a dangerous special offender prior to trial or to
entry of a guilty or nolo contendere plea) to ascertain whether the defendant should
be subject to an increased sentence. The defendant may be characterized as a dan-
gerous special offender at this hearing merely upon a showing of a preponderance of
the information. If, as has been suggested, the rationale behind having a greater
burden of proof in criminal cases is that a defendant's liberty is jeopardized, then
surely Congress does not recognize that rationale since under § 3575 a defendant may
be deprived of his liberty solely because of his special classification based upon a mere
preponderance determination.
163. 397 U.S. at 377 (emphasis added). The majority opinion cites to many cases
wherein the "reasonable doubt" requirement has long been reiterated. However, other
than an historical analysis, a statement that the formula arose around 1798, and a
discussion that the standard is "vital" in order to reduce factual errors, the Court
never offers substantive support concerning the necessity under due process of a "be-
yond a reasonable doubt" standard in lieu of a fair preponderance standard. See id.
at 362-66.
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of a "'jurisprudence of conceptions', . . .[allowing] the extension of a
maxim or a definition with relentless disregard of consequences to
'a dryly logical extreme' ."164
When the reasonable doubt standard in criminal procedure began
to take form, every defendant was in very grave peril; the death pen-
alty was quite common, even for the most trivial of offenses.1" 5 Justice
Matthew Hale, taking note of the generalized severity of sentences,
specified that a high burden of proof was necessary to convict a de-
fendant."" Nevertheless, in Regina v. Burton,167 when the argument
was made that the defendant's conviction was not supported by a suf-
ficiently high burden of proof and the court was referred to Hale's state-
ment as authority, the judges indicated that Hale's observations were only
warnings and not law.'6 " Shortly thereafter, however, the commen-
tators began distorting the burden of proof requirement beyond even
what Justice Hale may have intended. Blackstone reproduced a state-
ment attributed to Hale-"the law holds it is better that ten guilty
persons escape than that one innocent suffer."' 69  Hale's original state-
ment, however, would have allowed only half that number of guilty de-
fendants be set free. 170  Starkie, whose work on evidence was probably
the finest treatise compiled in its time, exaggerated the statement to the
point of absurdity by pontificating: "The maxim of law is, that it is bet-
ter that ninety-nine (i.e., an indefinite number of) offenders should es-
cape than that one innocent man should be condemned."'171 Despite
164. Hynes v. New York Cent. R. Co., 231 N.Y. 229, 231, 131 N.E. 898, 900
(1921). Justice Cardozo's statement was based upon Dean Pound's article which criti-
cized courts for mechanically applying a rule long after the reason for the rule had
ceased to exist. Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 CoLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908).
165. May, Some Rules of Evidence, 10 U.S.L. Rav. 642, 651-52 (1876).
166. SeeM. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CRoWN 289 (1694).
167. 6 Cox. Crim. Cas. 293 (1854).
168. Id. at 294.
169. 4 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *358.
170. "It is better that five guilty persons should escape unpunished than one inno-
cent person should be convicted." 2 M. HALE, PLEAS OF Tr CRowN 288 (W. Stokes &
E. Ingersoll ed. 1847). The context of this statement must not be forgotten. Cer-
tainly, an underlying consideration for the statement was the horrible punishment
which awaited most convicted defendants at that time.
171. 1 T. STARIUE, A PAmcICAL TREATISE OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE 506 (4th Am.
ed. 1832). But see May, Some Rules of Evidence, 10 U.S.L. REV. 642, 655 (1876):
This is the logic which the world has accepted for half a century without
scoffing. Better that any number of savings-banks be robbed than that one
innocent person be condemned as a burglar! Better that any number of innocent
men, women, and children should be waylaid, robbed, ravished, and murdered by
wicked, wilful, and depraved malefactors, than that one innocent person should
be convicted and punished for the perpetration of one of this infinite multitude
of crimes, by an intelligent and well-meaning though mistaken court and jury!
Better any amount of crime than one mistake in well-meant endeavors to suppress
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the rhetorical appeal of these slogans, however, the fact remains that the
only way to ensure the nonconviction of any innocent person is to con-
vict no one at all." 2
The use of the reasonable doubt standard manifests the proclivity
of the courts to adopt Hale's distended rubric. The reasonable doubt
standard seems to have first been enunciated in the High Treason
cases tried in Dublin in 1798. The judges there, in commenting on
the standard of proof necessary to convict, instructed that there was a
maxim which required acquittal if the jury entertained any rational
doubt of a defendant's guilt."' Prior to the High Treason cases, juries
had been charged in principle to convict when a clear impression of
guilt existed. For example, "[e]very verdict ought to be the jury's
own and ought to proceed on clear grounds of fact."'
1 74
Historical drift, then, has led to a Procrustean rule which is unnec-
cessary to, and in fact impedes, the development of a more efficient
system of criminal justice.
[O]stensibly, under the guidance of that old cautionary doctrine, that
it is better to err on the side of mercy than on the side of justice. . . we
have come, by a series of glosses and dilutions and limitations, to a doc-
trine which logically gives justice to nobody, and mercy to those only
who show none and deserve none.175
Perhaps at one time a greater burden of proof would have been man-
dated by the fundamental fairness concept inherent in the Due Proc-
ess Clause, but modem criminal procedures and penalties bear not even
a faint resemblance to "criminal justice" as applied in the days of Lord
Matthew Hale. The protections offered a defendant today ensure an
impartial determination of guilt or innocence, perhaps fair to the point
of presenting the state with insurmountable obstacles to the conviction
of many guilty defendants. 176  The presumption of innocence need
not be changed; however, a burden of proof must be employed which
or prevent it! Better for whom? we beg leave to ask; for society, or for the
malefactor?
Justice Breitel is in full accord. Breitel, Criminal Law and Equal Justice, 1966 UTAH
L. REv. 1, 11, 18-19.
172. Cf. Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STr. L. REV.
1065, 1073 (1968).
173. L. MAcNALLY, THE RuLEs OF EVIDENCE ON PLEAS OF THE CROWN 2 (1811).
See May, Some Rules of Evidence, 10 U.S.L REv. 642, 656-57 (1876).
174. Rex v. Hardy, 24 How. St. Tr. 199, 1383 (1794). Accord, Rex v. Tooke,
25 How. St. Tr. 1, 742-43 (1794).
175. May, Some Rules of Evidence, 10 U.S.L. REV. 642, 659 (1876).
176. See text accompanying notes 27-31 supra.
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makes that presumption rebuttable. 77
V. MODIFY THE APPELLATE PROCESS AND LIMIT THE SCOPE
OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
Few more common criticisms of criminal appeals are made than that
of the delay that is almost invariably involved. This criticism as much
as any has led to opposition to any appeal at all. It has been argued that
if punishment is to prevent or deter crime it must be swift, but cannot be
[swift] because of appeal.'
78
The federal and state appellate systems are in an evident state of
paralysis due to the burgeoning number of criminal appeals.' 79 The
present vogue of appealing convictions "all the way up" seems to have
so bogged the appellate process as to destroy the effectiveness of the
criminal law and to cast the entire legal system into disrepute. 80 If
177. Cf. NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAws, STUDY DRAFT OF
A NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 103 (1970) which reads in part:
No person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of the offense
is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. An accused is assumed to be innocent until
convicted. (Emphasis added).
An explanation that the presumption of innocence is merely the equivalent of saying
that the prosecution has the burden of proof, i.e., that the presumption is not evidence
and adds nothing to the burden, is also necessary if the term is to be defined. Cf.
E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 40 (1956).
178. L. ORPIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 122 (1939) (footnote omitted).
179. Recent Supreme Court decisions have removed many of the obstacles which
at one time impeded indigent defendants from appealing their convictions. See, e.g.,
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (states required to furnish indigents with
counsel on appeal in criminal cases); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (states may
not require indigent defendants in criminal cases to pay a filing fee before permitting
them to file a motion for leave to appeal in one of their courts); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956) (states may not deny appellate review solely on account of a de-
fendant's inability to pay for a transcript). The result of said decisions has dramatic-
ally accelerated the rate of criminal appeals. ABA, PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO CRIMINAL APPEALS 20 (Tent. Draft
March 1969):
The jurisdiction with the farthest advance in rate of defendant appeals is the
District of Columbia. Of defendants convicted after trial, the percentage who filed
appeals in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reached 92.6% in fiscal year 1966; this may be compared with the figure from
1950 of 18.3%o.
See also THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A NEw
REGULATORY FRAMEwoRK: REPORT ON SELECTED REGULATORY AGENCIES 57 n.13
(1971) wherein it is noted that the total number of appeals to the United States
Courts of Appeals has more than doubled in the last nine years, rising from 4204 in
1961 to 10,248 in 1968; Philips, Appellate Review in the Sixth Circuit, 2 MmcPmS
STATE U.L. REv. 1 (1971) wherein the author reports that the annual volume of ap-
peals to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has nigh tripled in an eight year period.
180. See H. ZEisEL, H. KALVEN & R. BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT xxii (1959);
Burger, The State of the Judiciary-1970, 56 A.B.A.Y. 929, 931 (1970); Hufstedler,
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we are to inject any quantum of finality into the administration of jus-
tice, and, accordingly, instill the fear of certain and swift punishment
into the guilty, the present and overburdened appellate structures of the
state and federal systems must be modified.
The needed change could be accomplished through any one of three
basic reforms: (1) eliminate in certain instances the right to an elec-
tive appeal;' 8 ' (2) provide appellate courts with exclusive criminal jur-
isdiction; or (3) provide an additional tier of review for the already
morassed state and federal appellate systems. In any event, frivolous
appeals would have to be strictly and carefully screened.
Neither the federal government nor the states are constitutionally re-
quired to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review.1
8 2
New Blocks for Old Pyramids: Reshaping the Judicial System, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 901
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Hufstedler]; Christian, Delay in Criminal Appeals: A Func-
tional Analysis of One Court's Work, 23 STAN. L. REV. 676 (1971) wherein the author
notes, in a particular study of the appellate process in California, that "[t]he full course
of a criminal appeal in the First Appellate District takes an average of 498 days (456
days median), well over 16 months." Id. at 677 (footnote omitted).
Delay may also impede the accused from presenting an adequate defense because of
the loss or destruction of documents, the death or disappearance of witnesses or the
inability of witnesses to recall relevant facts. See generally Dickey v. Florida, 398
U.S. 30 (1970) (death and unavailability of witnesses and loss of records were relevant
factors in finding that defendant's right to speedy trial under Sixth Amendment had
been infringed); Tynan v. United States, 376 F.2d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (loss of
documents due to flooding held not to have unduly prejudiced defendant in bringing
appeal).
Delay is perhaps felt strongest at the trial court level. The Los Angeles County
Superior Court, though probably the most updated system in the country, has a cur-
rent backlog of 50,000 cases. Hufstedler, supra, at 905. In United States ex rel.
Frizer v. McMann, 437 F.2d 1312 (2d Cir. 1970), the court took notice of the
egregious delays afflicting the New York State criminal court system. For example,
there were 2,899 persons accused of a felony in New York State who had been in jail
three months or more pending trial. In many homicide cases, the detention before
trial had already exceeded one year. Id. at 1315.
181. An appeal at the election of the defendant is to be distinguished from a man-
datory appeal in every instance. This elective right to appeal is the prevailing prac-
tice in the United States. Some jurisdictions, however, provide for an automatic and
mandatory appeal from any conviction for which the death penalty has been given.
See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1239(b) (West 1970).
182. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S.
272 (1895): "'A review by an appellate court . . . was not at common law and
is not now a necessary element of due process of law."' Id. at 275, quoting McKano
v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894); United States v. Coke, 404 F.2d 836, 843 (2d
Cir. 1968); Tinkoff v. United States, 86 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1936): "As there is no con-
stitutional right to an appeal in criminal cases, the court may, within its statutory
powers, affix such conditions thereto as seem fit." Id. at 881. United States v. St.
Clair, 42 F.2d 26, 29 (8th Cir. 1930). Moreover, until shortly before the turn of the
century, federal criminal cases were generally not appealable. The Supreme Court
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Thus a possible, and apparently constitutional, solution for our over-
burdened appellate courts would be to eliminate in toto the right to ap-
peal. One jurisdiction already seems to disallow appeals from convic-
tions of minor misdemeanors; 188 perhaps this unlocks the door to func-
tional appellate reform. Such a limitation of the right to appeal to only
those convicted of serious crimes would apparently withstand judicial
scrutiny"" and would certainly aid in relieving the appellate system. 85
Alternative methods of reform, however, would substantially preserve
the process of appellate review and would accordingly placate those
who have considered the right to appeal to be fundamental. 186  An
(the only federal court of appeal at the time) would review a criminal case only when
there was a division of opinion in the circuit court concerning a question of law.
Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 6, 2 Stat. 156, 159-61; Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 1,
17 Stat. 196. The Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517 § 5, 26 Stat. 827, provided for ap-
peals in criminal cases to the newly created courts of appeals. At present, however,
all the state and federal courts allow some appellate review. ABA, PROJECT ON
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO CRIMINAL Ap-
PEA.S 17 (Tent. Draft March 1969); see 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970); FED. R. App. P.
3,4.
It is curious why the framers failed to provide for appellate review as a matter of
right in the Constitution itself. Though article III, § 2 of the Constitution does af-
ford the Supreme Court limited appellate jurisdiction, it appears that said jurisdiction
only applies to civil cases. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; Cf. THa FEDERALIST No. 81, at 550
(J.E. Coke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) (wherein it is indicated that there was no inten-
tion on the part of the Framers to change or expand upon the common law mode of
appellate review).
183. See ABA, PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STAND-
ARDS RELATING TO CRIMINAL APPEALS 17 (Tent. Draft March 1969) wherein the au-
thors note that the Louisiana Supreme Court, the only Louisiana court with criminal
appellate jurisdiction, is authorized to entertain appeals from only those convictions for
which a defendant is fined $300 or sentenced to serve more than six months in jail.
It appears that Arkansas disallows appeals as a matter of right from non-capital
offenses. In such cases, appeal is granted at the discretion of the trial court. If
refused, a further application can be made to the Arkansas Supreme Court, which will
allow the appeal unless it is determined to be frivolous. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2708,
43-2709, 43-2710, 43-2723 (1964).
184. The right to trial by jury is required in state criminal proceedings only where
imprisonment for more than six months is authorized. Baldwin v. New York, 399
U.S. 66, 68-69 (1970); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968). Since this right, which
is directly posited through the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, is not recognized for
minor offenses, how could the right to appeal, which is not constitutionally founded
at all, be said to apply to minor offenses? As such, the limitation of the right to
appeal to only those convicted of serious offenses should definitely withstand attack.
185. See note 180 supra. Limiting the right to appeal would assuredly lend support
to the venerable adage that if a job can be well done once, it should never be done
twice. If we could provide able and scholarly trial judiciary, there would be no need to
second-guess and criticize their every performance.
186. In Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962), Justice Stewart noted
that: "Justice demands an independent and objective assessment of a district judge's
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examination of the dual functions of appellate courts will reveal that
while the first provides no compelling reason to preserve the appellate
process, the second serves an essential role which illuminates the pro-
priety of substantially retaining appellate review.
Appellate courts serve (1) to determine the correctness of lower
court decisions, and (2) to provide didactic guidance on how a particu-
lar problem should be handled in the future.187  It is submitted that the
former function alone, especially in light of the current appellate de-
lays, could never justify the existence of appellate courts. The philoso-
phy which underlies this function connotes a type of indeterminism, and
commands that if a job is to be performed adequately it must be per-
formed multifariously. Such a philosophy lacks objective verification.
While redetermination of facts is usually not allowed on review, appellate
courts often serve to correct errors in conclusions of law by delving into
the factual determinations of the lower tribunal. Moreover, redetermi-
nation of legal issues for the sole sake of achieving a correct result often
entails repetition, seldom involves the formulation of new principles, and
deserves to be given no more credibility than the initial determination.
Such consecutive attempts to determine correctness can only entail a
wasteful exhaustion of resources and a needless duplication of effort. If
such second-guessing is indeed deemed essential, a "final" determina-
tion after only two or three reviews could never be justified and the
quixotic quest for the ultimate certitude would continue ad infinitum.
The companion and didactic function of appellate courts, however,
appraisal of his own conduct of a criminal trial." Id. at 455-56 (concurring opinion).
Some courts have interpreted this statement rather broadly and in reliance thereon
have deemed the right to appeal to be a fundamental right, not limited by its statutory
basis. See, e.g., Nance v. United States, 422 F.2d 590, 592 (7th Cir. 1970). However,
when Justice Stewart's remark is examined in the context of his opinion, it is apparent
that he was merely referring to the type of assessment required for indigent defendants
who are denied leave to appeal while other more affluent defendants may avail them-
selves of the right. 369 U.S. at 456. Nevertheless, other courts and commentators have
independently considered the right to appeal to be of such a compelling nature that to
abrogate it in toto would contravene fundamental fairness. See, e.g., Turman v. Beto,
271 F. Supp. 808, 812 (N.D. Tex. 1967):
Appellate review has become so ingrained in the history of our judicial system
that it contravenes one's sense of fairness to see a convicted man stand before a
judge and be sentenced without the knowledge that he has the right to appeal
his conviction.
Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76
HARv. L. Rav. 441, 453 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Bator] ("it would simply go
against the grain, today, to make a matter as sensitive as a criminal conviction subject
to unchecked determination by a single institution.").
187. See ABA SECTION ON JUDCIA. ADMimsT ATON, INTERNAL OPERATING PRO-
CEDURES OF APPELLATE COURTS 65 (1961); Hufstedler, supra note 180, at 910.
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provides a more compelling rationale for preserving appellate review.
This function ensures the requisite uniformity and certainty in the de-
cision-making process and has been deemed the "fundamental in-
stitutional purpose" of appellate review.18  Of necessity there must be
some process which both provides uniformity in decisions and adjudi-
cates cases of the first impression within particular jurisdictions."" Oth-
erwise, persons similarly situated would be subjected to diverse interpreta-
tions of the law and the anomalous situation could arise where no court
within a jurisdiction would recognize sister decisions as compelling or
persuasive. While the performance of this function inevitably entails
some redetermination of lower courts' findings and conclusions, the
institutional purpose to be served is so overriding that any concomitant
second-guessing can be overlooked.
Once we have recognized this animating reason for retaining some
form of appellate review, two alternative modes of reform may be con-
sidered. First, the state and federal governments might consider the
establishment of appellate courts with exclusive criminal jurisdiction-
Criminal Appellate Courts. Such tribunals would be favored with a
continuity of subject matter, allowing the justices thereon to attain a
higher peak of proficiency. The Criminal Appellate Courts would af-
ford plenary hearings for all claims and would fulfill the essential didac-
tic and stabilizing functions of appellate courts. Decisions of these tri-
bunals would be final within their jurisdictions and would be subject to
review only by the Supreme Court. 9 ' The state Criminal Appellate
Courts, depending upon the population and crime incidence of the par-
ticular state or circuit, could be partitioned into departments or divi-
sions consisting of three or more judges apiece. Each division would
decide its own cases, being guided and directed by constitutional man-
dates of the Supreme Court. To avoid stagnation in their decision-mak-
ing roles, the judges could intermittently transfer to civil courts deriving
therefrom a perhaps refreshing interlude from their one course criminal
diets. Hopefully, however, the general continuity of the subject matter
reviewed would permit the Criminal Appellate Court justices to more
expeditiously and judiciously dispose of appeals. Dockets would be
188. Bator, supra note 186, at 453.
189. See generally K. LLEWELLYN, THE CommsoN LAw TRADrnON, DECIDING Ap-
PnALs 17-61, 215-17 (1960).
190. See U.S.C. § 1257 (1970) which provides for Supreme Court review of state
court judgments. An exclusive court of appeal would preserve the refining and
clarifying functions of intermediate courts thought so essential to effective Supreme
Court review by Justice Stone. See A. MASON, HARLAN FisuE STONE: PILLAR OF THE
LAw 386 (1956).
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cleared more swiftly and delays would be shortened, not only due to the
absence of a third tier of review, but also because of the expectant
shorter duration required for disposition of the appeals. 191 Less delay
would inject a greater certainty into the adjudication process, while the
lack of a superior second-guesser would impart the requisite finality.' 92
Second, a vertical extension of the appellate systems might be con-
sidered. Such an extension would entail the addition of lower level tiers
between the trial courts and initial courts of appeal. Judge Shirley M.
Hufstedler of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently proposed
such a modification of the appellate process. 19s Judge Hufstedler would
provide for "Courts of Review" consisting of one trial judge and two
appellate judges. These courts would afford a plenary review for final
judgments, with all post conviction motions and grounds for appeal
.consolidated at the hearing.' This review would constitute the only
appeal as a matter of right with two senior courts of review available
to accommodate the teaching function of appellate review.'0 5
The most compelling aspect of this proposal is the consolidation of
all post trial motions into one hearing. At present, arbitrary post-con-
viction defense motions can effectively prolong a criminal proceeding
for an indefinite period of time. A recent example of the delay involved
is provided by the case of Cliff Jones, who was convicted in 1968 in
the Bobby Baker payoff case, and who still remains free on bail while
his attorneys incessantly harangue the appellate courts with various post
191. As the Criminal Appellate Court judges become more proficient in that field
of the law, they should be able to make decisions more fluidly and in shorter time
durations. While it has been contended that greater proficiency leads to greater delay
through more care and deliberation (Hazard, Alter the Trial Court-The Realities of
Appellate Revieiv, in AMERicAN ASSEmBLY, THE CouRTs, THE PuBLic AND THE LAW
EXPLOSION 80 (Jones ed. 1965) ), it seems that the opposite conclusion is the more
sound-greater proficiency, less time to formulate and deliberate, and thus less delay.
192. Oklahoma and Texas presently maintain Courts of Criminal Appeals which
have exclusive criminal jurisdiction and whose decisions are final and non-reviewable.
OKLA. STATS. ANN. tit. 20, § 40 (1962); TEX. CODE CGRiM. PRoc. ANN. arts. 4.01,
4.03 (1966); Ex parte Waldock, 142 Okl. 258, 286 P. 765, 767 (1930); State ex rel.
Wilson v. Briggs, 171 Tex. Crim. 479, 351 S.W.2d 892 (1961). However, no
empirical data exists with which to judge the efficacy of the courts vis-t-vis appellate
courts of general jurisdiction.
Of course, an additional reform for the appellate morass would be the limitation of
unnecessary opinion writing by the appellate judges. While this is more in the nature of
a housekeeping function, perhaps prompt legislation could delimit the parameters
of permissible "opinionating."
193. Hufstedler, supra note 180.
194. Id. at 911.
195. Id. at 911-12; see text accompanying notes 187-90 supra.
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trial motions.1"' Stringently enforced time limitations governing the
initial review would aid in eradicating such abusive delay, while discre-
tionary superior review, perhaps only upon certification by the Court
of Review, would assist in achieving some measure of finality.
Concomitant to an effective modification of the appellate process is a
likewise effective solution to the present rash of frivolous appeals. 97
Since convicted indigents risk nothing and spend nothing to pursue their
appeals,' it is reasonable to assume that the majority of such appeals
will be groundless. 99 What is needed is an equitable mechanism where-
by frivolous appeals may be effectively screened-out of the appellate
process. While it has been opined by some that various filtering mecha-
nisms will fail for either constitutional or pragmatic reasons, 00 the Fifth
Circuit has recently adopted such a "mechanism"' 20 ' which appears to be
successful.20 2 Such an effort to introduce a greater degree of finality into
the appellate system has been praised by the Chief Justice; 203 it should be
emulated by the fellow circuit courts and by the states.
196. TnIm, Jan. 10, 1972, at 58-59. Mr. Jones, reveling in his freedom, exclaimed:
"'If I'd been a poor man, or even an average guy, I wouldn't have been able to afford
it.'" Id. at 59.
197. "An appeal is said to be 'frivolous' where it presents no debatable question or
no reasonable possibility of reversal, the word meaning of little weight or importance,
not worth notice, slight." United States v. Piper, 227 F. Supp. 735, 740 (N.D. Tex.
1964).
198. See cases cited in note 179 supra.
199. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting):
"We all know that the overwhelming percentage of in forma pauperis appeals are
frivolous." Proceedings of the 1966 Sentencing Institute for Superior Court Judges,
52 Cal. Rptr. 75-76 (App. 1966) (comments of Justice Gordon L. Files):
I don't know what proportion of criminal convictions are appealed today but I
am sure that the proportion is rising and will continue to rise, because under
existing law a defendant has absolutely nothing to lose. . . . We have many
appeals after guilty pleas, and we have many appeals where it is obvious from the
record that the trial judge has done everything within his power to give the de-
fendant the most favorable break he could in the way of a sentence. Yet the de-
fendant appeals knowing that on a retrial he can't be given anymore severe punish-
ment the second time. . . . (citations omitted).
200. See ABA, PROJECr ON MINMUM STANDARDS FOR CREMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO CRIMINAL A'PEALS 60-72 (Tent. Draft March 1969).
201. 5th CIR. R. 20:
If upon the hearing of any interlocutory motion or as a result of a review ....
it shall appear to the court that the appeal is frivolous and entirely without
merit, the appeal will be dismissed ....
202. See Nevels v. McCall, 407 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1969). The great majority of
cases which have to date considered frivolous appeals have been decided under Rule
46(a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure whereby a court may deny bail
pending appeal if it appears that the appeal is frivolous. See, e.g., United States v.
Sutton, 322 F. Supp. 1320 (S.D. Cal. 1971); United States v. Piper, 227 F. Supp. 735
(N.D. Tex. 1964).
203. Burger, The State of the Judiciary-1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 929, 934 (1970).
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The finality sought to be achieved by modifying the appellate process
is entirely dependent, however, upon the scope afforded the writ of
habeas corpus.2 °4 Mainly because of the expansion of Fourteenth
Amendment due process to the states, °5 the Supreme Court has seen
fit to widen the scope of federal habeas relief to state prisoners.2 °0
As a result, the number of habeas corpus petitions from state prisoners
increased from 2000 in 1963207 to 8372 in 1971.208 The strain upon
the federal courts has been enormous. °0 Moreover, while many of
these petitions never reached the hearing stage, their prolificacy evi-
dences the tip of a monumental iceberg which threatens the entire sys-
tem of justice.
2 10
While the origin of the writ of habeas corpus is uncertain,21' it may
date back to as early as 1220 A.D.21 2 It developed as a vital part of the
common law and as such was carried over to America by the colo-
nists.2 a The writ was guaranteed by the Constitution,214 and the first
204. Habeas corpus literally means "you have the body." BLACK'S LAW DICTnONARY
837 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). From its very inception, habeas corpus has provided the
method whereby an individual can challenge an unlawful detention. Lay, Post Convic-
tion Remedies and the Overburdened Judiciary: Solutions Ahead, 3 CREIGHT. L. REv.
5, 6 (1969).
State prisoners may seek federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970).
Federal prisoners may seek equivalent relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). For an
exhaustive survey of post-conviction relief afforded by the several states see Study,
State Post-Conviction Remedies and Federal Habeas Corpus, 12 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 149, 183-225 (1970).
205. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and cases cited in note 9 supra.
206. See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963) (while this decision was
restricted to section 2255 petitions from federal prisoners, its principles have extended
to petitions from state prisoners as well) [for a discussion see text accompanying notes
238-41 infral; Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) [discussed at text accompanying notes
230-33 infra]; Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
207. DnRCroR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF TE UNITED STATES COURTS,
ANNUAL REPORT 201 (1963).
208. DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE, OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
ANNUAL REPORT 45 (1971).
209. See Lay, Post Conviction Remedies and the Overburdened Judiciary: Solutions
Ahead, 3 CREIGHT. L. Rv. 5, 12 (1969).
210. See Badger, A Judicial Cul-de-Sac: Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,
50 A.B.A.J. 629, 634 (1964); Bator, supra note 186.
211. Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1038,
1042 (1970).
212. Id.
213. Carpenter, Habeas Corpus in the Colonies, 8 AM. HIsT. REv. 18, 19-21
(1903); see Longsdorf, Habeas Corpus A Protean Writ and Remedy, 8 F.R.D. 179
(1948).
214. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 9.
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Congress saw fit to pass the Judiciary Act of 1789 which provided in
part that:
[t]he justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of the district courts,
shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an
inquiry into the cause of commitment . . . [of] prisoners . . . in cus-
tody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States .... 215
In exercising this power, it is significant that the federal courts lim-
ited themselves to challenges of the sentencing court's jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant and the subject matter of the suit.s16 This
jurisdictional concept was gradually expanded to include persons con-
fined upon convictions obtained under unconstitutional statutes,217 con-
victions obtained in the absence of grand jury indictments,2 18 and con-
victions obtained under erroneously interpreted indictments.219 How-
ever, any proclivity toward a further expanded writ was discouraged in
favor of retaining a balanced relationship between the federal govern-
ment and the states.
[D]iscretion should be exercised in the light of the relations existing,
under our system of government, between the judicial tribunals of the Un-
ion and of the States, and in recognition of the fact that the public good
requires that those relations be not disturbed by unnecessary conflict be-
tween courts equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the
Constitution.
220
However, in 1915, the Supreme Court indicated that it might consider
more than just the traditional jurisdictional concepts in deciding
whether to accept petitions of habeas corpus from state prisoners.22'
Subsequently, in Townsend v. Sain,222 Fay v. Noia,22 s and Sanders v.
United States, 224 the Supreme Court revamped the narrow scope of the
Great Writ into what today may be termed the Grand Appellate Writ.
215. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82.
216. See, e.g., Exparte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 203 (1830):
An imprisonment under a judgment cannot be unlawful, unless that judgment
be an absolute nullity; and it is not a nullity if the court has general jurisdiction
of the subject, although it should be erroneous.
Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18 (1876); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272 (1895).
217. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
218. Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885).
219. In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274 (1887).
220. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886).
221. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915). The federal courts had been granted
the jurisdiction to entertain state prisoner habeas corpus petitions in 1867. Act of
Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1970)).
222. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
223. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
224. 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
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In Townsend the Court demoted finality and promoted relitigation by
articulating a broad standard which expanded the availability to ha-
beas corpus petitioners of federal evidentiary hearings.225 Such hear-
ings are required unless "the state-court trier of fact has after a full
hearing reliably found the relevant facts. 220  While perhaps ration-
alized upon the ground that such a requirement will compel the states
to reinforce their fact-finding procedures, the Townsend decision in fact
merely promotes needless repetition, waste and delay, and disrupts the
delicate balance of federalism deemed essential by the Founding Fa-
thers.2  The standard enunciated requires the federal courts to reliti-
gate the facts if one of six grounds are present.228 Clearly, "reliability"
is a standard which affords a broader and more encompassing scope
than does the traditional sufficiency standard used by the appellate
courts. Nothing could be
more subversive of a judge's sense of responsibility, of the inner sub-
jective conscientiousness which is so essential a part of the difficult and
subtle art of judging well, than an indiscriminate acceptance of the no-
tion that all the shots will always be called by someone else.
229
In Fay v. Noia130 the Court further demeaned the state processes
by holding that (1) the federal courts can choose to disregard state
court findings of waiver or forfeiture,23 1 and (2) the adequate and in-
225. Where the facts are in dispute, the federal court . . . must hold an evi-
dentiary hearing if the habeas applicant did not receive a full and fair evidentiary
hearing in a state court, either at the time of the trial or in a collateral proceeding.
372 U.S. at 312 (footnote omitted).
226. Id. at 313 (footnote omitted).
227. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 445 (Clark, J., dissenting).
228. Relitigation is required:
[I]f (1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing;
(2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a
whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not ade-
quate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of
newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed
at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of
fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing. 372 U.S. at
313.
In 1966, a congressional amendment to section 2254 was passed in an attempt to
settle the redetermination crisis. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1970), amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 (1964). The amendment provides that state findings of fact which are sup-
ported by reliable and adequate evidence shall be presumed to be correct unless the
state proceeding was deficient in any one of eight respects. However, the amendment
appears merely to reinforce the Townsend decision, leaving intact the requirement of
relitigation if certain broad grounds are present. See Developments in the Law-
Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HAv. L. Rnv. 1038, 1141-42 (1970).
229. Bator, supra note 186, at 451.
230. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
231. See id. at 398-99. The exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. section 2254
(1970) (a state prisoner's remedies must be exhausted prior to filing for federal
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dependent state grounds doctrine23 2 is merely a "function of the limi-
tations of appellate review" which is not, according to the Court, to be
applied in collateral proceedings.2 33 As a result, collateral proceedings
assumed a posture superior and contradictory to appellate proceedings.
No longer would "reviewing courts" be either limited by the factual de-
terminations of lower tribunals, or governed by the sound and cogently
conceived tenets of the past which are basic to the tenuous balance of
federalism. Rather, the new Appellate Writ has taken the stead of
functional appellate review and has reduced the concept of finality to
an absurdity.
Professor Paul Bator has sounded a strong objection to the Writ's en-
croachment into the process of appellate review.2 34  He notes that the
concepts of finality and non-redetermination which play an important
role in the decision whether to retain appellate review235 even more
persuasively demand a limit to the expanding writ of habeas corpus.1
36
Professor Bator envisions the processes of appellate review and collat-
eral relief as distinct, each with a separate purpose to fulfill. Should we
allow the collateral relief process to delimit the functions of appellate
review, we would in effect be exhibiting a significant degree of mistrust
in a fundamental institution. A system which allows for endless refiling
and relitigation in the federal courts has an abrasive effect upon state
processes, disallows meaningful reform in state criminal procedures,
and enervates the goal of rehabilitation within the prison system by fail-
ing to convince the convicted that they are once-and-for-all guilty.
23 7
Finally, in Sanders v. United States,23s the Court effectively limited
the bar of res judicata to successive petitions under sections 2244 and
2255. Sanders allowed federal habeas corpus judges, in their discre-
habeas corpus) was held to refer "only to a failure to exhaust state remedies still open
to the applicant at the time he files his application for habeas corpus in the federal
court." Id. at 399. But see Picard v. Connor, 40 U.S.L.W. 4088 (U.S. Dec. 20, 1971)
wherein the Court took a more federalist approach in denying a habeas corpus petition
where the state's highest court had no opportunity to hear the petitioner's claim:
"[lt would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal district
court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to
correct a constitutional error." Id. at 4089-90, quoting Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S.
200, 204 (1950).
232. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87
U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
233. 372 U.S. at 429.
234. Bator, supra note 186.
235. See text accompanying notes 186-188 supra.
236. Bator, supra note 186, at 444-54.
237. See id. at 452, 524-25.
238. 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
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tion, to afford controlling weight to denials of prior petitions when
(1) the same ground presented in the subsequent application was de-
termined adversely to the applicant on the prior application, (2) the
prior determination was on the merits, and (3) the ends of justice would
not be served by reaching the merits of the subsequent application.239
It is noteworthy that the federal judges are not compelled to deny a sec-
ond hearing if one or more of the grounds are present; they "may" de-
cline to do so if they desire. Judge Donald P. Lay of the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals has noted:
This decision [Sanders], which has affected both state and federal pe-
titions, also had a major impact on the dockets of the federal courts.
Finality, at the expense of criminal justice, was not to be a precept of
post conviction remedies.
240
The need for basic limitations upon the present writ is manifest.
The requisite changes, however, must be either judicially or congres-
sionally induced and, so far, neither the Congress nor the Court has
indicated a willingness to comply.24 ' While one alternative would be
to limit the writ within its historical judicial perimeters, such a change
would necessarily require an about-face by Congress and the Court.
Perhaps the restriction of habeas corpus hearings to only those peti-
tioners who evidence a clear showing of innocence would provide a
more tenable solution for the present appellate writ.242 A more re-
strictive attitude toward the voluminous number of frivolous petitions
may also help curtail the commission of perjury in the writ. Moreover,
239. Id. at 15.
240. Lay, Post Conviction Remedies and the Overburdened Judiciary: Solutions
Ahead, 3 CREiGHT. L. Rnv. 5, 12 (1969) (footnote omitted). In 1966, Congress en-
acted a new statute which applies Sanders' restricted res judicata principles to the states.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1970). This subsection provides in part that:
[Slubsequent applications . . . need not be entertained ... unless the applica-
tion alleges or is predicated on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on the
hearing of the earlier application for the writ . .. Id. (emphasis added).
While the "ends of justice" criterion was not adopted by Congress, the "need not"
language of the subsection certainly implies that the habeas judge retains the discre-
tion to permit or deny an application.
241. Congress explicitly refused to limit the writ to its proper scope by excluding
the proposed section 2256 from the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified in scattered sections of titles 5, 18,
28, 42 and 47 of the United States Code). Section 2256 would have provided that state
court judgments in criminal cases regarding questions of fact or law could be re-
viewed by federal courts on appeal or certiorari only, and would have denied collateral
review. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess.
242. See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 242 (1969) (Black, J., dis-
senting): "I would always require that the convicted defendant raise the kind of con-
stitutional claim that casts some shadow of a doubt on his guilt."
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if the United States Attorneys undertake to prosecute the many petitioners
who flagrantly perjure in their applications, a significant decrease in the
volume of petitions may be wrought.
43
Whatever the method or cure, however, it is indeed incumbent upon
us now to question the expansive writ which forbodes the destruction
of the very judicial system which nurtured and encouraged its de-
velopment. "Finality at some point is indispensable to any rational-
and workable-judicial system.
' '244
VI. CONCLUSION
The object of the preceding proposals is, again, to elicit discussion
and encourage debate concerning the reformation of our system of crimi-
nal procedure. If they fail to do this, it is a sad commentary. This is a
time when the well-being of society is challenged by crime but when
the citizen on the street demands enlightened law enforcement. It is a
time when the respect manifested our criminal courts is at low ebb yet
the power and influence of the law is at its height. This is a time when
legal skills are prostituted to outmoded procedures but when much con-
cern is expressed that reform be righteous. Unless thought is given im-
mediately to such reform and unless that thought is translated into ac-
tion, then all our wealth, our ideas, and our affection for fairness may
be worth nothing. The words of Chief Justice Burger are apposite:
Our whole history as a nation reflects a fear of the power of govern-
ment and a proper concern for individual liberty. These feelings have
led us to place many protections around persons accused of crime.
And this has resulted in a system in which it is often very difficult to
convict even those who are plainly guilty.
Government exists chiefly to foster the rights and interests of its
citizens-to protect their homes and property, their persons and their
lives. If a government fails in this basic duty, it is not redeemed by
providing even the most perfect system for the protection of the rights
of defendants in criminal courts. 245
243. For a recent state decision affirming a conviction for perjury based upon a
defendant's declaration in a habeas corpus petition, see People v. Morris, 20 Cal. App.
3d 659; 97 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1971).
244. Burger, The State of the ludiciary-1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 929, 934 (1970).
245. LiFE, August 7, 1970, at 26.
1972]
